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I. INTRODUCTION
If a pollster asked a random selection of Americans for a one-line
verbal portrait of arbitration, common responses might include the
following: (i) private litigation arising for construction and business
disputes; (ii) a mechanism to resolve workplace tensions between
management and labor; (iii) a process by which finance companies
and stock brokers shield themselves from customer complaints; (iv) a
way to level the playing field in deciding commercial controversies
among companies from different parts of the world; (v) the way big
corporations use NAFTA to escape regulation. To some extent all
would be correct. 1
Unfortunately, these different varieties of arbitration have all
been squeezed into the same antiquated arbitration statute. Enacted
75 years ago as a simple procedural device to enforce arbitration in
federal courts, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) has now been
pressed into service as a body of substantive law that binds state
courts as well, requiring that arbitration agreements be enforced on
the same footing as other contracts. 2 The Act is as ill-suited to such
use as an all-terrain vehicle. As drafted, the FAA ignores critical
distinctions in the level of judicial supervision suitable to different
types of cases. The laissez-faire court scrutiny appropriate to an
international proceeding, between sophisticated business managers
with access to competent counsel, may be quite misplaced in a
consumer case, where an arbitration clause might require an ill________________________________________________________________
1.
Divergent portrayals of arbitration bring to mind the John Godfrey Saxe
poem The Elephant, about six sightless men describing a pachyderm. Having touched
only one part of the anatomy (side, tusk, trunk, knee, ear, and tail), each respectively
thought the elephant to be like a wall, spear, snake, tree, fan, and rope. The verses
conclude, “And so these men of Indostan disputed loud and long, each in his own
opinion exceeding stiff and strong, though each was partly in the right, and all were in
the wrong.” John Godfry Saxe, The Blind Man and the Elephant, in THE POEMS OF
JOHN GODFRY SAXE 135 (J.R. Osgood ed., 1873).
2.
See discussion infra Section V.B (discussing Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto,
517 U.S. 681 (1996)).
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informed individual to seek uncertain remedies at an inaccessible
venue. 3 Moreover, basic arbitration notions are hidden in a maze of
inconsistent cases that are anything but user friendly: they disorient
and confuse litigants from abroad, adding significant transaction
costs to the choice of arbitration in the United States. 4
The time has come to consider amending the FAA to provide
greater clarity for international arbitration. One springboard for
reform can be found in the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law, 5
which has already engendered a rich case law that could serve as a
prism to separate and identify many of the interrelated themes in
cross-border arbitration. 6 The Model Law, however, should not be
imported wholesale. 7 Any amendment of the Federal Arbitration Act
must take account of home grown arbitration concerns and
precedents. 8 Part of the peculiar U.S. genius has been our ability to
adapt (rather than adopt) inventions from abroad. 9
________________________________________________________________
3.
See generally id.
4.
The transaction costs to the parties (including attorneys fees for appellate
review) are different from those incurred by society, which must pay judges to decide
cases. For both the parties and society there may be costs resulting from the risk of an
incorrect result which would constitute one factor weighing in favor of judicial review.
5.
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, adopted June 21, 1985. As of the end of 2002,
the Model Law had been adopted by more than fifty jurisdictions, including four U.S.
states (California, Connecticut, Oregon, and Texas) and all of Canada’s provinces.
6.
See generally HENRI C. ALVAREZ, NEIL KAPLAN & DAVID RIVKIN, MODEL
LAW DECISIONS: CASES APPLYING THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2003).
7.
One commentator has described the UNCITRAL Model Act as “an ersatz
statute divorced from the rich and distinctively American federal experience with
arbitration” and suggested that what is needed is “a work of renovation, the dusting of
an antique, not a revolution.” Joseph D. Becker, Fixing the Federal Arbitration Act by
the Millennium, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 75, 75 (1997).
8.
For a more ambitious proposal on adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law,
see Jack J. Coe, A Critical Appraisal of the Federal Arbitration Act 1925 and of the
Suitability of the Model Law as Its Replacement for International Commercial Disputes
(1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics) (on file with
author). Compare the more cautious alternative advocated in William W. Park, The
Interaction of Courts and Arbitrators in England: The 1996 Act as a Model for the
United States?, 1 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 54, 67 (1998). For commentary positive to the
Model Law, see James Carter, Federal Arbitration Act Seen as Out of Step with Modern
Laws, 5 NEWS AND NOTES FROM INSTITUTE FOR TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1 (1990)
(criticizing utility of UNCITRAL Model law for U.S.); Report of the Committee on State
International Arbitration Statutes (ABA Subcommittee, Section on International Law
and Practice, March 1990). Compare the less favorable evaluations in David Rivkin &
Frances Kellner, In Support of the FAA: An Argument Against U.S. Adoption of the
UNCITRAL Model Law, 1 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 535 (1990); Report of the Washington
Foreign Law Society on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, reprinted in 3 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 303 (1988); Report of the
Committee on Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution, Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, reprinted in 1988-89 ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 250 (1989).
9.
For comparative studies of the various options available as legal
frameworks for arbitration in several major arbitral centers, see JEAN-FRANÇOIS
POUDRET & SÉBASTIEN BESSON, DROIT COMPARE DE L’ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL
(2002); JULIAN D.M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN KROLL COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2003).

The most critical need is for limitations on judicial review of
international arbitration awards, permitting international arbitration
law to evolve free from whatever paternalistic measures might be
appropriate to domestically cultivated concerns. 10 Such reform would
facilitate efficient and neutral dispute resolution by keeping judges
from second guessing arbitrators on the merits of a dispute, while
still permitting courts to support arbitration by enforcement of
agreements and awards, as well as through interim measures in aid
of arbitration. 11
It is well known, of course, that certain arbitration service
providers and industry groups oppose change. 12 They justify their
reform-phobia by reference to the vagaries of the U.S. legislative
process. 13 Once Congress goes into motion (so some fear), a Pandora’s
Box of special interests will open to unleash forces that would
eviscerate arbitration’s effectiveness.
Such skepticism of the democratic process is misplaced. There is
no reason to think that Americans today are less capable of
intelligent legislation than they were in the past. Moreover, the winds
________________________________________________________________
10.
A separate set of provisions for review of international awards is not the
only task confronting those hoping to enhance the quality of American arbitration law.
For a European perspective on U.S. arbitration law reform, see Pierre-Yves Tschanz,
International Arbitration in the United States: The Need for a New Act, 3 ARB. INT’L
309 (1987). On FAA reform, see generally authorities cited in note 8. See also Charles
A. Hunnicut et al., Report to the Washington Foreign Law Society on the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 3 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
303, 303 (1988); American Arbitration Association, Office of the General Counsel,
Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as
Federal or State Legislation, ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 250, 250-62 (1988); André J.
Brunel, A Proposal to Adopt UNCITRAL’s Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration as Federal or State Legislation, 25 TEX. INT’L L. J. 43 (1990); A Report of
the New York State Bar Association International Litigation Committee, Commercial
and Federal Litigation Section, The UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, 23:87 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 87, 87-88 (1990-1991); Daniel
M. Kolkey, Reflections on the U.S. Statutory Framework for International Commercial
Arbitrations: Its Scope, its Shortcomings, and the Advantages of U.S. Adoption of the
UNCITRAL Model Law, 1 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 491, 491 (1990).
11.
Some cynics might question whether U.S. courts would in fact pay
attention to an amendment of the FAA. See, e.g., comments of Richard W. Hulbert,
Proceedings of The Institute of Judicial Administration Conference on Arbitration,
NYU (Sept. 19, 2002). In a case confirming application of the FAA in state courts,
Justice O’Connor expressed similar disenchantment with judicial interpretation of
federal arbitration law, suggesting that “over the past decade the Court has abandoned
all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration
Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation.” Allied-Bruce
Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995).
12.
See generally Hulbert, supra note 11.
13.
At a recent colloquium in New York, the General Counsel of an important
arbitrator service provider referred to the “shivers down the spine” produced by
mention of FAA amendment.

of change are already blowing, and the question is no longer if but
how reform will occur. 14
II. THE ARCHITECTURE OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW
A. Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) subjects most arbitration in
the United States to a single standard for judicial review, 15
regardless of whether the dispute is big or small, domestic or
international, and notwithstanding state attempts to create a more
nuanced framework for arbitration. 16 As a consequence, international
arbitration unfolds haunted by the specter of anti-abuse measures
intended to protect consumers and employees, 17 relying on the
exercise of judicial discretion in an inefficient, case-by-case fashion. 18
________________________________________________________________
14.
A more practical concern relates to the difficulty of obtaining reform.
Certain fatalists suggest that time and energy would be wasted in advancing a
proposal which the American Arbitration Association and industry groups would seek
to torpedo. This is an odd objection. The urge to improve, one would hope, remains
valid notwithstanding opposition from entrenched interest groups. History is full of
intelligent propositions (whether economic, political, social or religious) that were once
fiercely contested by established orthodoxy.
15.
The U.S. Supreme Court has construed narrowly the FAA exclusion of
“contracts of employment” to cover only contracts for “transportation workers” such as
seamen and railroad employees who provide services directly in foreign or interstate
commerce. Collective bargaining agreements, however, rest on a separate statutory
foundation with an ill-defined relationship to the FAA. See Taft-Hartley LaborManagement Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2003); see also Textile Workers
Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957) (holding that federal
courts may fashion a body of federal law specifically for enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements).
16.
See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1297.11; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 50a-100; FLORIDA
STAT. § 684; OR. REV. STAT. § 36.450; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 172.001
(exemplifying state initiatives inspired by or incorporating principles of the
UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Act). However, the preemptive effect of federal law
relegates state arbitration statues to gap-filling on ancillary matters, thus giving state
statutes only marginal impact. For example, an arbitrator’s authorization to
administer oaths derives from UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 7. The validity of a state
rule depends on its perceived harmony with the policies underlying federal law.
17.
See, e.g., discussion of “manifest disregard of the law” infra Section IV.A.
For judicial agonizing over how to treat arbitration agreements in employment
contracts, see generally Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001).
See discussion infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text; Wright v. Universal
Maritime Services, 525 U.S. 70, 76 (1998); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, 500 U.S.
20 (1991); Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration & Voluntary Consent, 25
HOFSTRA L. REV. 83 (1996). For similar concerns about consumer and small business
arbitration, see generally Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (1998); ITT Cons.
Fin. Corp. v. Patterson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563 (1993); Teleserve Sys. v. MCI, 659 N.Y.2d
658 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Brower v. Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (A.D. 1st Dept.
1998). See generally Symposium on Arbitration in the Securities Industry, 63 FORDHAM
L. REV. (1995).
18.
In one case the court ordered costly discovery on the very fairness of
institutional arbitration. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, 965 F. Supp. 190, 192
(D. Mass. 1997), aff’d on other grounds, 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Specht v.

Understanding the American framework for arbitration requires a
brief look at the Second Circuit decision in Alghanim v. Toys ‘R’ Us, 19
which held that domestic judicial review standards applied to awards
rendered in international arbitrations with a U.S. situs. 20 The case,
which involved a $46 million award rendered in New York in favor of
a Kuwaiti licensee of a U.S. toy store, 21 was challenged for alleged
“manifest disregard of the law” by the arbitrator—a ground for
vacatur under domestic law but not under the New York Arbitration
Convention. 22
One must remember that when adopting the 1958 New York
Arbitration Convention, the United States accepted its application
not only to awards rendered abroad, but also to so-called “nondomestic awards.” 23 The award in Toys ‘R’ Us fell under the latter
category (“non-domestic”) and thus was subject to the Convention.
Two of the three parties were non-American, and the underlying
agreement involved performance in the Middle East. 24
Convention awards would normally be subject to FAA § 207,
which provides that a court “shall confirm the award” unless it finds
one of the defenses to recognition contained in Convention Article
V. 25 These defenses essentially supply escape hatches related to
Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 40 (2d Cir. 2002), refusing to enforce
arbitration clause included in downloaded software. In action for alleged violations of
federal privacy laws; the Court held that reasonably prudent internet users would not
have learned of arbitration before downloading software, since agreement to arbitrate
presented at bottom of scroll-down screen; cf. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447,
1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (enforcing arbitration clause in shrinkwrap license included with
software).
19.
Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 23-25 (2d
Cir. 1997).
20.
Domestic arbitration is covered by Chapter 1 of the FAA. See 9 U.S.C.
(2000). Chapters 2 and 3 are designed principally to address recognition of awards
made under the New York and Panama Conventions, which covers principally foreign
awards.
21.
The Hong Kong affiliate of Toys ‘R’ Us was also implicated in the
arbitration. Toys ‘R’ Us, 126 F.3d at 15.
22.
Id.
23.
Foreign awards are described as “made in the territory of a State other
than . . . where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought,” while nondomestic awards are defined to include “awards not considered as domestic awards in
the State where recognition and enforcement are sought.” New York Convention, art.
I(1) (June 10, 1958). By contrast, the United Kingdom took a different approach in a
reservation applying the Convention “only to . . . awards made in the territory of
another Contracting State.” British arbitration legislation limits the scope of the New
York Convention to awards made in the territory of a state “other than the United
Kingdom.” Arbitration Act, 1996, § 100(1) (Eng.). The United States took no such
reservation. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2000) (including within the scope of the Convention even
arbitration agreements entirely between American citizens as long as related to
property, performance or enforcement abroad, or bearing some “reasonable relation” to
a foreign country).
24.
Id.
25.
New York Convention, art. I(1) (June 10, 1958, art).

procedural due process, public policy, and vacatur at the place where
an award is made. 26
Drawing what seems to be a distinction between motions to
confirm and motions to vacate awards, and notwithstanding the
language of FAA § 207, the Court in Toys ‘R’ Us found that a nondomestic award made in the United States would be subject to
vacatur “in accordance with its domestic arbitration law and its full
panoply of express and implied grounds for relief” including “manifest
disregard of the law.” 27
Not all jurisdictions follow the Toys ‘R’ Us approach. The
Eleventh Circuit has held that the New York Convention’s grounds
for refusal to confirm foreign awards were also the exclusive bases on
which to review a “non-domestic” award made in the United States. 28
A federal district court in Miami came to the same result with respect
to a motion to confirm an award among foreign parties made in
Florida. 29
________________________________________________________________
26.
Id. Article V permits non-recognition in the event of (i) invalid arbitration
agreement, (ii) lack of proper notice, (iii) arbitrator excess of authority, (iv) irregular
composition of the arbitral tribunal, (v) award vacatur at the place where (or under the
law of which) made, (vi) non-arbitrable subject matter or (vii) violation of public policy.
Id. art. V.
27.
Toys ‘R’ Us, 126 F.3d at 23. The court in Toys ‘R’ Us held that the award in
question did not constitute “manifest disregard of the law.” For other cases in which
federal courts have been asked to subject international awards to domestic vacatur
standards, including “manifest disregard of the law,” see Lummus Global Amazonas,
S.A. v. Aguaytra Energy de Peru, 2002 WL 31401996 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (vacating in part
and confirming in part an award arising from construction of a natural gas pipeline in
Peru; modified to incorporate the parties’ joint stipulation on construction credits),
Westinghouse Int’l Serv. Co. v. Merilectrica, D. Mass., C.A. No. 00-11832 (Sept. 27,
2001) (upholding an award in a South American power plant construction dispute). See
also discussion of Westerbeke v. Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd., 304 F.3d 200, 220-23 (2d Cir.
2002) infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text. See also Industrial Risk Insurance v.
M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte G.m.b.H., 141 F.3d 1434 (11th Cir. 1998); Four Seasons
Hotels and Resorts B. V. v Consorcio Barr S.A. 267 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
28. Industrial Risk Insurance, 141 F.3d 1434, 1441-42 (11th Cir. 1998) (involving
a AAA arbitration in Florida between a German corporation and an U.S. insurer). The
dispute arose from malfunction of a “tail gas expander,” a turbine generating electricity
from waste gasses in nitric acid manufacture. Id. Giving a broad scope to the concept of
“non-domestic” arbitration award, the court held that an award made in the United
States falls within the purview of the New York Convention, and is thus governed
exclusively by Chapter 2 of the FAA. Id. at 1441.
29. Four Seasons Hotels, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1335-37 (S.D. Fla. 2003)
(applying the New York Convention as the exclusive grounds for considering
confirmation of a AAA award rendered in Miami). The dispute between two foreign
corporations concerned a hotel operation in Caracas, which the parties had subjected to
Venezuelan law. The court also found that the New York Convention trumped the
Inter-American Arbitration Convention, since not all parties to the relevant
agreements were from countries that had adhered to the latter treaty. The court clearly
distinguished between an enforcement action and an action to vacate By virtue of the
Miami situs of the proceedings, U.S. rather than Venezuelan courts were found to be
the competent authority to vacate the award. Personal jurisdiction over the Venezuelan
party was found by virtue of its participation in the Florida-based arbitration. The
court also gave an interesting analysis of personal jurisdiction under the federal “longarm statute” contained in Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.

B. The Need for a New Statute
Such conflation of domestic and international arbitration is a bad
idea as a matter of both sound policy and national self-interest.
Rather than a hospitable climate for international arbitration, the
business community is left with little clear guidance to predict how
courts will react to allegations of arbitrator error. Diverse cases call
for different levels of judicial review, with the least interventionist
role assumed in arbitration between sophisticated business entities
from different countries.
The United States remains a victim of a self-inflicted competitive
disadvantage imposed by its single legal framework for arbitration.
The spillover of domestic precedents into international cases will
inevitably chill selection of U.S. cities for arbitration (with fewer fees
to arbitrators and counsel) by foreign parties understandably hoping
to avoid excessive judicial interference.
The FAA should be amended to provide a separate framework for
international arbitration that would contain default rules limiting
judicial review of awards to the narrowest grounds. In addition,
parties might be given appropriate options to select greater judicial
scrutiny. Such reform would keep courts away from arbitration
except to support the process by enforcing agreements and awards
and supplying interim measures in aid of arbitration.
Reform could be accomplished either through tinkering with the
existing FAA Chapters 2 and 3 or by adding a new chapter which
would cover all international proceedings in the United States,
regardless of whether they fit within these two treaties. The latter
approach, casting a wide net, might be the preferred avenue, since it
could help limit misguided judicial inventions to fill either real or
perceived gaps in the coverage of international arbitration. 30
Some might observe that good arguments also exist for broader
gauge change to protect all business arbitration, domestic as well as
international, from excessive judicial review on grounds such as
“manifest disregard.” The proposal in this paper is intentionally more
modest, however, stemming from a concern that wider modifications
of the FAA would meet more significant political impediments, thus
reducing the prospect of reform in the international arena, where the

________________________________________________________________
30.
For example, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Cortez Byrd, which
justified expansive venue for award vacatur as a way to permit American courts to
“vacate awards rendered in foreign arbitrations not covered by either convention.”
Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Const. Co., 529 U.S. 203, 203 (2000) (discussed
infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text).

special need for neutrality makes arbitration’s efficiency particularly
vital. As Voltaire observed, the best is often the enemy of the good. 31
C. Manifest Disregard of the Law
1. The Wilko Dictum
By statute, courts have been given power to vacate awards for
defects in the basic procedural integrity of the arbitration, 32 but not
with regard to either vague notions of public policy 33 or the merits of
a dispute. Fifty years ago, however, this statutory scheme was
amplified by dictum in a U.S. Supreme Court case prohibiting
securities arbitration. In Wilko v. Swan, the Court added “manifest
disregard of the law” as a basis for award vacatur. 34 This power to set
________________________________________________________________
31.
See generally, VOLTAIRE, LES OEUVRES COMPLETES DE VOLTAIRE, Oxford
(2000). Le mieux est l’ennemi du bien. Voltaire himself was apparently adapting an old
Italian proverb, Le meglio è l’inimico del bene.
32.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) provides for vacatur (i) for award procurement by
corruption, fraud or undue means, (ii) evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, (iii) arbitrator misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, and any other
“misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced,” (iv) where the
arbitrators exceeded their powers or “so imperfectly executed” their powers that a final
award upon the subject matter was not made. For a survey of these grounds for
vacatur, see generally Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial
Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial
Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443 (1998). See also Stephen L. Hayford
& Scott Kenigan, Vacatur: The Non-Statutory Grounds for Judicial Review of
Commercial Awards, 50 DISPUTE RESOLUTION J. 22 (Oct. 1996); Stephen L. Hayford,
Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards,
30 GA. L. REV. 731 (1996).
33.
Although labor cases permit an award to be set aside for contravention of
public policy, United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 47 (1987),
the FAA contains no reference to public policy as a ground for vacatur of an award. It is
uncertain whether in commercial arbitration violation of substantive public policy
constitutes a ground for vacatur. See Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int’l Mktg., 811 F.2d
1265, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1987) (implicating alleged illegal commissions to intermediaries
in armament contracts). After an arbitral tribunal had interpreted the governing law
(California) as permitting such commissions, a federal district court vacated the award
as “contrary to law and public policy,” only to be reversed by the Court of Appeals,
which held that U.S. policy was too ill-defined to justify annulment of the award.
34.
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). See generally Noah Rubins,
“Manifest Disregard of the Law” and Vacatur of Arbitral Awards in the United States,
12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 363 (2002). Wilko was overruled in Shearson/American
Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 224-25 (1987) (fraud claims under Exchange Act §
10b and Rule 10b-5) and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S.
477, 477 (1989) (Securities Act § 12(2) claims). Ironically, when the Wilko Court
invented “manifest disregard of the law,” it considered the concept as unduly restrictive
of judicial review. The fact that a finding of “manifest disregard” was the only way
courts could address a mistake was seen as evidence of the need to nip securities
arbitration in the bud by declaring the topic non-arbitrable. The Court stated:
[I]nterpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest
disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for
error in interpretation. The United States Arbitration Act contains no

aside awards provides perhaps the most compelling motive for FAA
reform.
Some interpretations of this concept take a restrictive view,
building on notions of “excess of authority” 35 to limit the principle to
decisions that ignore the contract or require parties to violate the
law. 36 Other courts, however, have taken a more expansive view,
effectively including mistakes of law 37 and moving well beyond the
consumer and employment context for which the doctrine had been
conceived.
Yet another approach to “manifest disregard” has been suggested
in Williams v. CIGNA Financial Advisors Inc. 38 and Bridas S.A.P.I.C.
v. Government of Turkmenistan. 39 In these decisions, the Fifth

provision for judicial determination of legal issues such as is found in
the English law. [Apparently a reference to the “case stated” provision
abolished in 1979.] As the protective provisions of the Securities Act
require the exercise of judicial direction to fairly assure their
effectiveness, it seems to us that Congress must have intended [Section
14 of the Securities Act, forbidding waiver of securities laws] to apply to
waiver of judicial trial and review.
Wilko, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953).
35.
See 9 U.S.C. § 10(4) (2003).
36.
See, e.g., Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1990) (Selya,
J.) (affirming a lower court’s refusal to vacate an award in a case wherein an investor
alleged that a broker wrongfully liquidated his holdings). The Court held that an
honest failure of interpreting the law is not enough to justify vacatur, which requires a
decision “contrary to the plain language” of the agreement or an indication that the
arbitrator “recognized the applicable law and then ignored it.” Id. at 8. Cf. Watt v.
Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2001). In Watt, Judge Easterbrook (for better
or for worse) aligned the concept with public policy, which in an international context
might diverge from applicable law. For example, an employment agreement to be
performed abroad might discriminate on the basis of gender or religion in a way
acceptable under the applicable foreign law. The court stated, “If manifest legal errors
justified upsetting an arbitrator’s decision, then the relation between judges and
arbitrators . . . would break down.” Id. at 579. Judge Easterbrook interpreted the test
for vacatur as simply that “an arbitrator may not direct the parties’ to violate the law.”
Id. at 580.
37.
See Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, 148 F.3d 197, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1034 (1999) (reversing decision that refused to vacate award denying
age discrimination claim). See also Westerbeke v. Daihatsu, 304 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2002)
(discussed infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text). Only a few years ago one of the
finest U.S. arbitration scholars described the elements that a losing party must prove
to demonstrate “manifest disregard,” and then concluded, “[t]his will never happen in
our lifetimes.” Alan Scott Rau, The New York Convention in American Courts, 7 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 214, 238 (1996). Professor Rau not only feels that “manifest disregard”
is a dead letter, but “in operation the review standards of the Convention and the FAA
will be identical.” Id. at 236.
38. Williams v. CIGNA Financial Advisors Ind., 197 F.3d 752, 760-61 (5th Cir.
1999). Williams involved an age discrimination employment case arbitrated under
NASD rules. See generally Noah Rubins, “Manifest Disregard of the Law” and Vacatur
of Arbitral Awards in the United States, 12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 363 (2001).
39. Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Government of Turkmenistan, 2003 WL 22077651 (5th
Cir. 2003). Here, an Argentinean corporation sought to confirm an ICC award rendered

Circuit followed a two-prong inquiry in which it determined first
whether it was manifest that the arbitrators disregarded applicable
law. Thereafter, the court considered whether the award would result
in “significant injustice” under the circumstances of the case. Even if
there was “manifest disregard,” an award would be upheld as long as
no injustice resulted.
The problem is not necessarily in the “manifest disregard”
doctrine itself, which properly applied may have a salutary effect
where a special need exists for greater judiciary supervision. Rather,
the difficulty lies in the doctrine’s potential for mischief and misuse in
large international cases, when zealous litigators may be tempted to
press “manifest disregard” into service as a proxy for attack on the
substantive merits of an award.
2. Westerbeke v. Daihatsu
The risks of subjecting international cases to domestic grounds
for vacatur are illustrated in Westerbeke v. Daihatsu Motor Co.,
Ltd., 40 involving breach of a distribution agreement by a Japanese
manufacturer. A Japanese manufacturer had given a U.S. company
an exclusive right to sell certain contractually defined categories of
engines. If the manufacturer wanted to market a new line of
products, the sales agreement gave the distributor a right of first
refusal during a period of six months. 41
Ultimately, the deal went sour over a new product line that the
manufacturer began offering through another North American
distributor. The parties ended up in arbitration pursuant to
provisions of the 1952 Japan-U.S. Trade Arbitration Agreement
referenced in their contract. 42
The arbitrator awarded the distributor more than $4 million,
having found the sales agreement to constitute a binding contract
with a condition precedent in the form of a requirement that new
lines of engines were subject to a right of first refusal. The
manufacturer brought a motion to vacate the award, arguing that the
parties had reached only a “preliminary agreement to agree.” 43

in Houston (the parties having agreed to abandon Stockholm, the contractually
stipulated situs) under English law against the government of Turkmenistan and a
government-owned oil company. Not only did it refuse to vacate find any “manifest
disregard” of the law, the court also refused to vacate the award for excess of
jurisdiction and held that the government itself could not be forced to arbitrate as the
oil company’s alter ego. Id. at *13-14.
40.
Westerbeke, 304 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2002), rev’g 162 F. Supp. 2d 278 (2001).
See also Hoeft v. MVL Group Inc., 242 F.3d 57 (2003), reversing lower court decision
vacating an award for “manifest disregard” in an arbitration arising from a dispute
over a purchase price adjustment in the sale of a corporation engaged in market
research.
41.
Id. at 204-05.
42.
Id. at 205.
43.
Id. at 206.

Without a binding contract, the manufacturer argued, there could be
no recovery for expectancy damages (purchase of substitution goods
and lost profits), which was exactly what had been granted in the
arbitration. 44
To complicate matters, the arbitration had been bifurcated. A
liability phase addressed whether the new product was indeed an
engine within the terms of the contract. Then a subsequent stage
assessed the claimant’s damages. Unfortunate language in the
Interlocutory Award on liability (which arguably had res judicata
effect when it came time to draft the final decision) gave rise to an
argument that the arbitrator had decided the manufacturer owed no
more than a duty to negotiate in good faith. 45
The district court disagreed and vacated the award, holding that
the arbitrator had misapplied the New York law on damages. As an
additional ground for vacatur, the court held that the theory of
liability expressed in the first stage of the proceedings differed from
that articulated in the damages stage. 46
A year later the Second Circuit reversed, upholding the award of
lost profits. In deciding whether there had been “manifest disregard,”
the Court of Appeals announced a two prong test. An objective
element required inquiry into whether the relevant law was “well
defined, explicit and clearly applicable.” A subjective component of
the test involved examination of whether the arbitrator intentionally
ignored the law. 47
Applying this approach, the Court of Appeals looked first at New
York law on damages, which it found consistent with the arbitrator’s
award on the facts of the case. The court then proceeded to examine
the arbitrator’s intent, and found no evidence of knowing refusal to
apply the governing law. Finally, the court addressed the alleged
inconsistency between the Interlocutory and Final Awards. Giving
the arbitrator the benefit of the doubt, the court interpreted
ambiguous language in the Interlocutory Award in light of what the
court called a “clarification” in the Final Award, which had found the
sales agreement to constitute a contract with conditions precedent
rather than simply an “agreement to agree.” 48
Although the case itself had a happy ending for the arbitration’s
prevailing party, the process involved costly appellate briefing and
argument. The Court of Appeals had to examine the New York law on
calculation of damages, as well as the difference between a
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44.
By contrast, “reliance damages” would have been limited to amounts
actually expended by reason of depending on the seller’s promise, rather than the
“benefit of the bargain” of expected profits. Id. at 223.
45.
Id. at 212.
46.
See id.
47.
Id. at 216.
48.
Id. at 212.

“preliminary agreement” on one hand and a binding contract with
condition precedent on the other. 49 The court also had to explore the
very nature of “manifest disregard” and other domestically nurtured
defenses to award enforcement, 50 and investigate the facts that might
give an indication of the arbitrator’s state of mind when deciding the
case.
The very existence of the right to have judicial review on the
substantive merits of the case (particularly on a ground for challenge
as vague as “manifest disregard”) hangs over international
arbitration like a sword of Damocles, to be grasped by litigators and
judges alike. In principle, there would be nothing wrong with having
these questions decided in court. However, the parties had by
contract agreed to have the merits of their dispute decided by
arbitrators, not judges. The prospect of such judicial meddling in the
arbitral process can only alarm foreign enterprises contemplating
arbitration in the United States. The procedural and political
neutrality of international dispute resolution is compromised each
time a local judge intervenes in response to aggressive litigation
strategies that invoke precedents from domestic contexts.
Such temptations should be placed out of reach through a new
chapter in the FAA, expressly foreclosing back door judicial
interference with the merits of international cases. Giving litigants
from abroad a measure of confidence that the U.S. judiciary will not
unduly meddle in the substance of the case, such an amendment
would promote efficient international dispute resolution and would
make the United States a more user-friendly place to arbitrate.
III. THE SPECIFICITY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
A. Arbitration’s Role in Cross-Border Transactions
The need for special deference to arbitration and forum selection
clauses in international business was articulated thirty years ago in a
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. Addressing the problematic
nature of international litigation, the Court stated:
Much uncertainty and possibly great inconvenience to both parties
could arise if a suit could be maintained in any jurisdiction [where
personal or in rem jurisdiction might be established]. The elimination of
all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to
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49.
Id. at 202.
50.
For example, the Court had to consider the “essence of the agreement”
arguments derived from collective bargaining decisions rendered more than forty years
earlier in the so-called “Steelworkers Trilogy” cases. See United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960); see also Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-85 (1960). Under this line of cases courts may vacate
an award that does not “draw its essence” from the contract.

both parties is an indispensable element in international trade,
commerce, and contracting. 51

While the adjectives “all” and “indispensable” may constitute a
bit of hyperbole, the basic point seems beyond cavil. In a world
lacking any neutral courts of mandatory jurisdiction over
transactions that cross national borders, 52 arbitration usually does
impose itself on international transactions faute de mieux, bringing to
mind Churchill’s famous observation about democracy. 53 Courts have
enforced arbitration agreements in international cases involving
subjects that could not have been arbitrated in a single country
context, including securities, 54 antitrust 55 and bankruptcy. 56
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51.
See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972) (addressing
the need for certainty in the context of court selection clauses). Similar principles were
adopted for arbitration in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co, 417 U.S. 506, 522 (1974) and
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631-33 (1985).
52.
While a court in the United States exercising jurisdiction over a foreign
respondent might appear neutral to the U.S. side, the perception from abroad might be
quite different. The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) is limited
to state-to-state claims. A government must espouse the cause of its national, which is
rare with respect to private investment. Moreover, when the I.C.J has heard
investment claims during the past thirty years, the private investor has lost. See
Elettronica Sicula SPA (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 28 I.L.M. 1109 (1989)
(finding that there was no illegal taking when Italy requisitioned U.S.-owned plant to
prevent liquidation, and discussing in paragraph 48 the terms of Article 36 of the 1948
FCN Treaty between Italy and the United States); see also Barcelona Traction
(Belgium v. Spain) (2d Phase), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 9 I.L.M. 227 (1970) (not permitting
Belgium to bring claim of Belgian-owned Canadian company effectively dispossessed by
Franco of profitable Spanish assets). See generally F.A. Mann, Foreign Investment in
the International Court of Justice, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 92 (1992).
53.
Many forms of government have been tried, and will be tried in this world
of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has
been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms
that have been tried from time to time.
3 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, COMPLETE SPEECHES (1897-1963) 7566 (Robert Rhodes
James ed., 1974). The great statesman made the comment in the context of a House of
Commons debate on changes to the so-called Parliament Act on November 11, 1947.
54.
See Scherk, 417 U.S. 506, 511-13 (1974) (securities disputes arbitrable in a
German-American contract, at a time when the doctrine in Wilko v. Swan banned such
arbitration domestically).
55.
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
631-33 (1985) (anti-trust disputes arbitrable in a Japanese-American contract, at a
time when the American Safety doctrine banned arbitration of Sherman Act claims in
contracts entirely among U.S. residents). Much of the reasoning of Mitsubishi might
apply equally to domestic as well as international arbitration. Some observers feel that
the international focus of the decision was a way to make the result easier to swallow
by the public. See Jill A. Pietrowski, Comment, Enforcing International Commercial
Arbitration Agreements—Post Mistsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth,
Inc., 36 AM. U.L. REV. 57, 85 (1986) (critiquing the Court’s decision).
56.
For an example of a case in which an American company in search of the
home court advantage in Massachusetts bankruptcy court attempted to use the
bankruptcy laws to renege on its commitment to arbitrate, see Société Nationale
Algérienne pour la Recherche, le Transport, la Transformation et la Commercialisation
des Hydrocarbures (SONATRACH) v. Distrigas Corp., 80 B.R. 606, 613 (D. Mass. 1987).

Not everyone sees a need to give special treatment to
international arbitration. 57 Some countries have retreated from
divergent treatment of domestic and international arbitration, due to
concern that distinctions based on nationality might conflict with
international commitments. 58
There should be no mystery about the justification of a special
status for international arbitration. The goals that lead business
managers to insert arbitration clauses in cross-border contracts have
a different focus than those that drive domestic arbitration.
All forms of arbitration usually implicate perceptions about cost,
efficiency and expertise. International arbitration, however, involves
greater emphasis on foreclosing the gamesmanship of parallel foreign
litigation in each side’s home courts. 59 Arbitration clauses in crossborder contracts are usually prompted by apprehension about the real
or imagined bias of foreign judicial proceedings. 60 When a dispute has

In deciding that the federal arbitration laws prevailed over the Bankruptcy Code, the
court noted:
It is important and necessary for the United States to hold its domiciliaries to
their bargains and not allow them to escape their commercial obligations by
ducking into statutory safe harbors. Rather, our country should take special
pains to project those qualities of honesty and fairness which are essential
parts of the traditional American character.
Id. at 614.
57.
No less a scholar than Michael Mustill once wrote that he had “never
understood why international arbitration should be different in principle from any
other kind of arbitration.” See Michael Mustill, Cedric Barclay Memorial Lecture, ARB.
159, at 165 (Aug. 1992).
58.
Under the now superseded 1979 English Arbitration Act, pre-dispute
waiver of appeal on points of law was not allowed between or among residents and/or
citizens of the United Kingdom. See generally English Arbitration Act, 44 Eliz. 21
(1979) (Eng.). The 1996 Arbitration Act contained similar provisions, which never
entered into force due to a perceived conflict with obligations within the European
Union. See discussion of Philip Alexander Securities & Futures Ltd. v. Bamberger infra
Section IV.B (interpreting Article 12 of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community (EC Treaty), as amended by the Single European Act, the Treaty on
European Union (Maastricht) and the Treaty of Amsterdam). There have also been
reports that France is reconsidering the current distinction between domestic and
international arbitration. See discussion of debate in meeting of Comité français de
l’arbitrage held on June 19, 2002, reported in 13 WORLD ARB’N & MED. REP. 266, at 266
(October 2002).
59.
For Americans, analogous concerns over neutral dispute resolution are
expressed in the U.S. Constitution itself, which gives federal courts power over cases
“between citizens of different states” on the assumption that a Massachusetts
respondent facing an Alabama claimant (or vice versa) will feel more comfortable in
federal court than before the other side’s state judges. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2002) (codifying such “diversity jurisdiction”). In a related connection,
Alexander Hamilton argued that the “peace of the whole ought not to be left at the
disposal of a part.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961), quoted in GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 11 (3d ed. 1996).
60.
For analogous principle, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2003) (setting out that U.S.
federal courts, under “diversity” jurisdiction, can remedy disputes between citizens of
different states provided amount in dispute exceeds a certain threshold).

contacts with multiple countries, the parties may seek a playing field
that is more neutral (procedurally, politically, and linguistically) than
national courts. 61
Absent reliable arbitration, judicial proceedings might go
forward in a foreign language and perhaps before a xenophobic judge
in a country lacking a tradition of judicial independence. 62 In an
international contract, the value of a reliable dispute resolution
clause may rise to a considerable percentage of the amount of the
contract value. 63
The special raison d’être of international arbitration means that
the parties often place a premium on freedom from the type of judicial
scrutiny that would impinge on procedural neutrality. For many
wealth-creating transactions, the prospect of foreign court
intervention will chill cross-border economic cooperation, causing
productive transactions to falter or become more expensive. 64
Without predictability about applicable substantive and procedural
norms, business managers may hesitate to consummate transactions
or charge greater prices to cover the risk of uncertainty in the event
of dispute. 65 Although the perception of litigation bias against
foreigners is sometimes more significant than the reality of prejudice,
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61.
Occasionally national courts of third countries might fill this role. However,
limits related to subject matter jurisdiction and forum non conveniens often make this
option problematic as a practical matter. See generally WILLIAM W. PARK,
INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION (1995).
62.
Although a Massachusetts company might not relish having to go to court
in Atlanta, relatively familiar procedural norms would still be applied in some variant
of the English language. However, proceedings in Algiers would involve the tongue of
Mohammed rather than Shakespeare, with local counsel required to advise on an
unfamiliar code of civil procedure. Consequently, in such cases, the parties might
choose ICC arbitration in Geneva, providing a greater sense of fairness ex ante
(whatever the parties’ second thoughts after the dispute arises) than the vision of U.S.
juries or Algerian judges. Dispute resolution could proceed in a mutually accessible
country by a tribunal chaired by someone of a nationality different from the parties, in
a common language and according to procedural principles that give neither side an
unfair advantage.
63.
For a charming illustration of this principle, see Emmanuel Gaillard, The
Economic Value of an Arbitration Clause, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 7, 1999, at 3. Professor
Gaillard posits a construction company owed $100 million by a foreign customer that
refuses to pay. Id. Although the builder’s case is well founded, bias in host country
courts causes the builder to settle for half the claimed amount. Id. Thus the economic
value of a well drafted arbitration clause would be $50 million. Id.
64.
On the effect of litigation risk aversion in international business, see
generally William W. Park, Neutrality, Predictability and Economic Cooperation, 12 J.
INT’L ARB. 99 (1995).
65.
Greater risks require greater returns. To illustrate, imagine two potential
investments, one in Country A presenting an opportunity for a large profit, but with a
good chance that local courts will be biased against a foreign party, and another in
Country B yielding a smaller profit, but with fair dispute resolution. Depending on how
large the disparity between the expected returns, many risk-averse foreign merchants
will choose the lower return coupled with the fairer legal system.

the consequences will be the same in that some transactions will not
go forward without a reliable alternative to judicial litigation. 66
It is often difficult for Americans to understand how disagreeable
our civil justice system appears to foreigners. A recent article by a
German scholar referred to U.S. litigation as a “procedural monster”
that is feared because of its “appetite, sharp teeth and
capriciousness.” 67
Since contracts do not enforce themselves, but need flesh and
blood adjudicators, who interprets an international agreement has
often been more significant than what the applicable law says about
its construction. Large portions of international arbitration procedure
can be explained as an attempt to maximize the legitimacy of a
process detached from the normal sources of authority. 68
The specificity of international transactions has led many
countries to adopt separate statutes for international arbitration.
Belgium, 69 France, 70 and Switzerland, 71 as well as places that have
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66.
A recent study found evidence that in federal civil actions in the United
States, foreigners actually fare better than domestic parties, due in part to a fear of the
American civil justice system that causes foreign litigants to continue to final judgment
only when they have particularly strong cases. See Kevin Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1122 (1996)
(analyzing cases decided from 1986-94).
67.
Rolf Stürner, Why are Europeans Afraid to Litigate in the United States?, in
CONFERENCE SERIES OF CENTRO DI STUDI E RICERCHE DI DIRITTO COMPARATO E
STRANIERO 15 (M.J. Bonnell ed., 2001). Stürner, who teaches in Fribourg, Germany,
examines discovery, juries, costs rules (with each side bearing its own legal costs),
extraterritorial jurisdiction, and direct service of process rather than through Hague
Convention. See generally id.
68.
For example, the practice of constituting an arbitral tribunal with each side
making a nomination gives parties a measure of comfort that someone they trust will
be on the inside to keep the adjudication honest. By contrast, for domestic transactions,
the individuals who will decide cases are selected either by a government (in the case of
judges) or a national arbitration institution that commands a measure of respectability
among all the parties. Even an institution such as the ICC represents only a vague and
shadowy presence for most American lawyers, and to those from developing countries
the ICC may be perceived as tending to select arbitrators principally with European or
North American backgrounds.
69.
Currently the Belgian CODE JUDICIAIRE prohibits courts from hearing
challenges to awards made in Belgium if neither party is a Belgian national or resident
and the parties have explicitly excluded judicial review:
Les parties peuvent, par une déclaration expresse dans la convention d’arbitrage
ou par une convention ultérieure, exclure tout recours en annulation d’une
sentence arbitrale lorsqu’aucune d’elles n’est soit une personne physique ayant la
nationalité belge ou une résidence en Belgique, soit une personne morale ayant
en Belgique son principal établissement ou y ayant une succursale.
CODE JUDICIAIRE art. 1717(4) (Belg.).
70.
N.C.P.C. art. 1492-1505 (Fr.).
71.
LOI FÉDÉRALE SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ/ BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER
DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT [LDIP] ch. 12 art. 176-95 (1989) (Switz.). See
generally P. LALIVE ET AL., , LE DROIT DE L’ARBITRAGE INTERNE ET INTERNATIONAL EN
SUISSE (1989).

adopted the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law 72 such as Canada, 73
Scotland 74 and Hong Kong, 75 all provide a more laissez-faire
framework for international arbitration.
B. What Makes Arbitration International?
A different standard for monitoring arbitration of domestic and
international transactions requires criteria to distinguish one from
the other. 76 Several criteria might be considered, including the
nature of the transaction as well as the parties’ residences 77 and/or
citizenship. 78 The UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law combines
multiple tests, bringing within its scope arbitrations in which (i)
parties have places of business in different countries, (ii) the place of
contract performance or the place of arbitration is outside the parties’
home country, or (iii) the parties opt to treat the proceedings as
international. 79
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72.
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, adopted by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law, June 21, 1985. See generally IGOR I. KAVASS & ARNO LIIVAK,
UNCITRAL: MODEL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 70 (vol. 2, 1985).
73.
The UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law has been adopted on the federal
level as well as by all Provinces. See generally Henri Alvarez, The Role of Arbitration in
Canada - New Perspectives, 21 U.B.C. L. REV. 247 (1987); Henri Alvarez, Judicial
Intervention and Review under the International Commercial Arbitration Act, in THE
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW IN CANADA (R.K. Paterson & B.J.Thompson eds., 1987).
74.
See Law Reform (Misc. Provision) (Scotland Act), 38 Eliz. 2, c. 40, § 66
(1990) (Eng.) (enacting the UNCITRAL Model Law for international transactions, and
also gives parties to a non-international agreement the right to bring their arbitration
within the Act). The UNCITRAL Model Law, as adopted in Scotland, is contained in
Schedule 7 to the 1990 Act. See generally John Murray (Lord Dervaird), Scotland and
the UNCITRAL Model Law, 6 ARB. INT’L 63 (1990). Article 34(2)(a)(v) of the Scottish
version of the Model Law adds “corruption, fraud and bribery” as grounds for vacatur.
Law Reform (Misc. Provisions) (Scotland Act), 51 Eliz. 2, Sch. 7, art. 34(2)(a)(v) (1992)
(Eng.).
75.
Hong Kong adopted almost verbatim the UNCITRAL Model Law in its
1990 Arbitration Ordinance, Hong Kong Laws Chapter 341. See Arbitration Ordinance,
Hong Kong Laws Ch. 341 Part IIA §§ 34A-34D (1990) (P.R.C.). See generally NEIL
KAPLAN, JILL SPRUCE & MICHAEL MOSER, HONG KONG AND CHINESE ARBITRATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS (1994). Although the People’s Republic of China has resumed
sovereignty over the former British colony, Hong Kong remains a “Special
Administrative Region” with many of its own laws, including a separate arbitration
ordinance. See BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Apr. 4, 1990) (in effect for a fifty-year transitional
period ending June 30, 2047).
76.
On characterization in conflict-of-laws, see Bernard Audit, Qualification et
Droit International Privé, 18 DROITS: REVUE FRANÇAISE DE THEORIE JURIDIQUE 55
(1993).
77.
See, e.g., LDIP art. 176, 192 (1989) (Switz.).
78.
For example, the United States excludes from the New York Convention
contracts arising from relationships entirely between citizens of the United States,
unless involving property, performance or enforcement abroad. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2002).
79.
UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law, § 1(3).

A party-oriented test to define international arbitration, which
looks to the residence of the litigants, has been adopted in Belgium 80
and Switzerland. 81 A less mechanical approach, asking whether a
transaction implicates international commerce, has been adopted by
the French. 82 To the limited extent that the United States recognizes
international arbitration’s specificity, a hybrid approach is taken. 83
A residence-based test seems most sensible. 84 The linguistic and
procedural differences that justify a laissez-faire arbitration regime
are more likely to arise when U.S. residents seek to avoid having
foreigners haul them into court in Paris, Rio, or Shanghai, rather
than when one U.S. citizen sues another in New York over goods
and/or services destined for export. A residence-based test would also
meet concerns expressed by some nations that a separate legal
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80.
See CODE JUDICIAIRE art. 1717 (Belg.) (making nationality as well as
residence a criterion for application of the special international regime).
81.
See LDIP art. 176 (1989) (Switz.) (applying the statutory provisions on
international arbitration to arbitration if at least one of the parties had neither its
domicile nor its habitual residence in Switzerland). For discussion of recent Swiss case
law on the definition of international arbitration, see Gabrielle Kaufmann, When is a
Swiss Arbitration International? JUSLETTER, Oct. 7, 2002, available at
http://www.weblaw.ch/jusletter (last visited Sept. 16, 2003). Professor KaufmannKohler calls into question a decision of the Swiss Tribunal fédéral of June 24, 2002, in
which the arbitrators had considered the relevant criterion to be the residence of the
parties to the arbitration agreement. Id. The reviewing court held that what counted
was the residence of the parties to the arbitral proceedings, thus ignoring contracting
parties which did not participate in the arbitration. Id.; see also LDIP art. 192 (1989)
(Switz.) (covering the right to opt out of any judicial review of awards if neither party is
resident in Switzerland).
82.
See N.C.P.C. art. 1492 (Fr.) (referring to disputes that “implicate
international commerce”). For a recent case testing this definition in the context of a
consumer contract (where a pre-dispute arbitration clause would normally not be
valid), see Cour de cassation, May 21, 1997, Meglio v. Société V2000. Cass. 1e civ., May
21, 1997, 1997 REV. ARB. 537 (note Gaillard); see also Cass. 1e civ., May 21, 1997, 1998
REV. CRIT. DR. INT’L PRIVÉ 87 (note Heuzé). The Cour de cassation upheld the validity
of an arbitration clause in an agreement for the purchase of a limited series Jaguar,
finding that the contract implicated international commerce by virtue of a transfer of
goods and funds between France and the United Kingdom. Id.
83.
The United States excludes contracts between U.S. citizens from the scope
of the New York Convention, which covers primarily foreign awards. 9. U.S.C. § 202
(2003). However, an agreement between U.S. citizens will be deemed to fall under the
Convention if the parties’ relationship “involves property located abroad, envisages
performance or enforcement abroad or has some other reasonable relation with one or
more foreign states.” Id.; see Lander v. MMP Invs., 107 F.3d 476, 478-80 (7th Cir. 1997)
(in which the Convention was applied between two American companies in connection
with their contract to distribute manufacturer’s shampoo products in Poland.)
Moreover, the United States applies the New York Convention to non-domestic awards
rendered in the United States if the award was made within the legal framework of
another country (i.e. foreign law) or involving parties domiciled or having their
principal place of business outside the United States. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp.,
710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983).
84.
As a matter of drafting, corporate entities should probably be considered
residents if organized under the law of, or possessing a principal place of business in,
the forum country. Thus, for example, a U.S. branch of a foreign corporation would be
considered a United States resident, as would an alien individual present in the United
States more than 183 days during any calendar year.

framework for international arbitration conflicts with treaty
prohibitions on nationality-based discrimination. 85
IV. JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF AWARDS
A. Statute, Treaty, and Public Policy
Judicial scrutiny of most awards made in the United States
generally follows the lines provided by Chapter 1 of the FAA. By
contrast, the New York Convention controls court review of foreign
awards, which is to say decisions rendered abroad. 86
As discussed earlier, things are a bit more complicated for
awards made in the United States that have a direct nexus to
international commerce. These arbitrations may give rise to an
overlap between the judicial control allowed under the FAA for
awards rendered in the United States and the New York Convention
provisions applicable to awards “not considered as domestic.” 87
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85.
See Phillip Alexander Securities & Futures Ltd. v. Bamberger, Court of
Appeal, reported in The Times, July 22, 1996 (losses in futures trading in an AngloGerman transaction). Sections 85-87 of the 1996 English Arbitration Act (containing a
special regime for domestic arbitration prohibiting pre-dispute waiver of appeal on
points of English law) never entered into force due to a perceived conflict with TREATY
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, as amended by the TREATY ON EUROPEAN
UNION, which in Article 12 (former Article 6) provides that “any discrimination on the
grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.” Concern was expressed that provisions of
the British consumer protection law would have protected British but not German
customers, and that even a residence based distinction might have constituted
disguised nationality-based discrimination. The Secretary of State was given the right
to order repeal or amendment of the protective régime (Act § 88) which was exercised
in Section 3, Statutory Instrument 3146, providing that the Act would come into force
“except sections 85 to 87” (relating to domestic arbitration). The English decision to
forego a separate international regime is a bit puzzling, since the British could have
dodged the EU bullet with something like the French test for characterizing
arbitration, which looks to see whether the arbitration “implicates international
commerce.” Belgium, thus far, seems to have gotten away with using nationality as one
of the tests for its special regime allowing exclusion of all court review. See CODE
JUDICIAIRE art. 1717(4) (Belg.).
86.
New York Convention art. I(1). For example, courts in Boston would
normally apply the Convention to an award made in Paris, but not to an award
rendered in Chicago. See FAA Chapter 2. For Latin American countries, the Panama
Convention applies many of the same principles. See FAA Chapter 3. When the
requirements for both the Panama and New York Conventions are met, the former
applies if a majority of the parties to the arbitration agreement are citizens of states
that have ratified or acceded to that Convention. 9 U.S.C. § 305 (2002).
87.
New York Convention art. I (3) and 9 U.S.C. § 202, discussed supra notes
25-26 and accompanying text. For cases interpreting the reference in Article I to
awards “not considered as domestic,” see Lander Co. v. MMP, Invs., 107 F.3d 476, 47880 (1997) (describing an arbitration between two American companies selling shampoo
in Poland), Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cir. 1983)
(arbitration between Swiss company and Norwegian ship owner).

While such non-domestic awards are explicitly subject to
standards for confirmation enumerated in the New York Convention,
nothing is said about any special grounds for their vacatur. This
problematic disjunction between grounds to confirm and grounds to
vacate 88 is particularly troublesome since in practice awards will be
subject to simultaneous motions to vacate (by the loser) and to
confirm (by the winner). Consequently, any modification to the FAA
might coordinate the vacatur and confirmation principles applied to
“non-domestic” awards. 89
At first blush it may seem puzzling that courts intervene at all in
a process designed to be private. Ironically, it is precisely the business
managers’ desire to have their disputes settled out of court that leads
judges to play a role in international arbitration. When a litigant
resists implementation of the bargain to arbitrate, courts must decide
whether to defer to the parties’ contract.
Arbitration proceeds in the shadow of government power at
several stages. The validity of an arbitration clause may first be
questioned in a motion to compel arbitration or to stay judicial
proceedings. During the arbitration itself, litigants sometimes
request interim measures such as enforcement of subpoenas or preaward attachment of assets.
Perhaps the most critical point comes in the arbitration
endgame, after the arbitrator’s decision, when the loser may resist
award recognition. As one form of risk management, judicial review
attempts to resolve tensions between the rival goals of award finality
(necessary to make arbitration reliable) and procedural fairness
(without which aberrant decisions would sap community confidence
in the process). Annulment of aberrant awards also has an in
terrorem effect that helps to reduce problems at earlier stages, since
most arbitrators are understandably averse to the public rebuke
inherent in having their awards vacated.
If an award is set aside where made, it not only becomes
unenforceable at the situs but also may lose its treaty-based validity
abroad. 90 Judicial review is vital when the winner seeks to attach the
loser’s assets or to block competing lawsuits. 91
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88.
See 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2002). (incorporated by reference into implementation of
the Panama Convention). In addition, the FAA extends to three years the time for
confirmation of “non-domestic” awards, while confirmation of domestic awards must be
made within one year from the date of the award. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2002).
89.
See id.
90.
It may be that under national law an award is enforceable regardless of the
absence of any treaty mandate. See generally Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Egypt, 939 F.
Supp. 907, 911 (D.D.C. 1996); see also New York Convention art. V(1)(e), discussed in
William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration, 93 AM. J. INT’L ARB.
805 (1999); Christopher R. Drahozal, Enforcing Vacated International Arbitration
Awards: An Economic Approach, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 451 (2000).
91.
See generally William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in International
Arbitration, 93 AM. J. INT’L ARB. 805 (1999).

At all stages of the arbitral process, questions may arise about
the “subject matter arbitrability” of cases that affect sensitive public
norms and delicate choice-of-law issues. 92 However, a long line of
federal court decisions has distinguished domestic and international
arbitrability, recognizing a hierarchy of values that make it
inappropriate in international arbitration to impose flat prohibitions
on arbitration of public law questions such as antitrust and securities
regulation. 93 Nevertheless, American courts have indicated that they
will refuse to recognize arbitration clauses that operate in tandem
with choice-of-law provisions to constitute a “prospective waiver” of
otherwise applicable mandatory norms. 94
The Convention’s practical effectiveness can also depend on the
idiosyncrasies of national procedural law. The New York Arbitration
Convention requires enforcement of awards “in accordance with the
rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon.” 95
Recent Court of Appeals decisions have shown how troublesome
national law can be, citing the above-quoted language (“procedure of
the territory where the award is relied upon”) as an escape hatch
from treaty enforcement obligations. On forum non conveniens
grounds, one court has refused to confirm an award rendered in
Moscow, 96 while another has denied recognition to a London award
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92.
Article V(2) of the New York Convention permits courts to refuse award
recognition sua sponte if they find “the subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration” or “the recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to the [recognition forum’s] public policy.”
93.
See generally Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. 614, 637-38 (1985) and
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); see also Sonatrach v. Distrigas
Corp., 80 B.R. 606, 612 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987). See generally William W. Park, Private
Adjudicators and the Public Interest: The Expanding Scope of International
Arbitration, 12 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 629 (1986); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from
Mandatory Rules: Privatization of Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703
(1999). The decision in Mitsubishi presumed that American courts could control
aberrant arbitral decisions by taking a second look at awards to insure that public
policy concerns were properly addressed. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638. This approach is
not without its problems. In an international context, assets outside the United States
may be available to enforce awards, obviating any need for the assistance of American
courts. Moreover, in arbitrations outside the United States arbitrators will
understandably fear that departure from the parties’ choice of law will increase the
risk of award vacatur at the situs on the basis of excess of arbitral authority.
94.
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637.
95.
New York Convention art. III.
96.
See Monégasque de Reassurances SAM v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine, 158
F. Supp. 2d 377, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d 311 F.3d 488 (2002). The award was
rendered in connection with a gas pipeline in Ukraine. Id. A reinsurance company
based in Monaco (subrogated to the rights of a Russian company) sought recognition of
an $88 million award against the defaulting party. Id. Complicating factors in the case
include the fact that one respondent (Ukraine) was both a sovereign state and a nonsignatory to the arbitration agreement. Id. While theories exist under which nonsignatories of arbitration clauses may be bound (such as agency, alter ego and
estoppel), the Second Circuit noted that application of any of these principles would

on the basis that “minimum contacts” with the United States were
absent, thus raising U.S. Constitutional notions of “due process” and
personal jurisdiction. 97
The decisions are unsettling to many observers who read the
Convention reference to national law as including only minor matters
such as filing requirements and fees. 98 Significantly, however, the
decisions note an absence of identifiable property within the
jurisdiction, 99 thus reducing the effect of the cases to situations in
which a winning respondent seeks award recognition in order to
preclude competing lawsuits.
B. Why, When, and How Courts Review Awards
1. Alternatives

require extensive discovery of documents outside the United States, and most probably
a trial. Monegasque, 311 F.3d at 500.
97.
See Glencore Grain Rotterdam BV v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain, 284 F.3d
1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing London Rice Brokers’ Ass’n arbitration) (stating
that sales in California not sufficient to establish jurisdiction over transaction
involving a Dutch grain trader and an Indian rice exporter); see also CNA Reinsurance
Co. v. Trustmark Ins. Co., 2001 WL 648948 (N.D. Ill. 2001). The Third and Fourth
Circuits reached similar results in cases bearing the same name relating to attempts to
enforce the same award, arising out of contracts between a Guernsey metals trader and
a Russian mining company. See Base Metal Trading v. OJSC Novokuznetsky
Aluminum Factory, 283 F.3d 208, 215-16 (4th Cir. 2002); Base Metal Trading v. OJSC
Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory, 2002 WL 31002609 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding a lack of
the “minimum contacts” with the United States required by due process).
98.
To apply an admittedly imperfect analogy, while in the United States local
law generally determines grounds for revocation of arbitration clauses, a state may not
impose legal obstacles that sabotage the pro-arbitration policy of the Federal
Arbitration Act. See Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686 (1996); AlliedBruce Terminex v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281-82 (1995); Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1 (1984); Securities Industry Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1114 (1st Cir.
1989).
99.
In Monégasque de Reassurances, the district court stated that “it is not
clear that Naftogaz has any assets in the United States from which Monde Re could
recover.” Monégasque de Reassurances S.A.M. (Monde Re) v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine,
158 F. Supp. 2d at 386. The Second Circuit stated that “the jurisdiction provided by the
[New York] Convention is the only link between the parties and the United States.”
311 F.3d at 499. In Glencore the Ninth Circuit stated that “Glencore fails to identify
any property owned by Shivnath Rai in the forum against which Glencore could
attempt to enforce its award.” Glencore, 284 F.3d at 1128. The presence of property
would seem relevant in light of the decision in Shaffer making a distinction between
jurisdiction on the merits of a dispute and jurisdiction to enforce judgment. See Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 186 n.36 (1977):
Once it has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that the
defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff, there would seem to be no unfairness in
allowing an action to realize on that debt in a State where the defendant has
property, whether or not the State would have jurisdiction to determine the
existence of the debt as an original matter.
For a subsequent analysis of Shaffer, see generally Burnham v. Superior Court of
California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), discussing California jurisdiction to serve a New
Jersey resident in the context of a divorce petition.

As in any reform, overhaul of arbitration rules and statutes
implicates a process of comparing alternatives. Most countries permit
judges to vacate decisions of perverse arbitrators who have ignored
basic procedural fairness or overreached their authority. 100 Another
paradigm also gives a right to appeal an award’s substantive legal
merits. 101 Some countries allow a choice between these alternatives,
with default rules that require litigants either to “opt in” 102 or to “opt
out” 103 of appeal on the substantive merits of the case 104 or permit
hybrid grounds for vacatur that imply something beyond a simple
mistake. 105
2. Situs Review
Public scrutiny of arbitration is inevitable at the time of award
recognition. Judges can hardly ignore the basic fairness of an arbitral
proceeding when asked to give an award res judicata effect by seizing
assets or staying a court action. Less evident, in an international
context, is why the arbitral situs should necessarily monitor an award
prior to an enforcement action. Often an arbitral situs is chosen only
for geographical convenience or procedural neutrality, 106 and the
dispute involves neither property nor activity at the place of
arbitration. In such circumstances, the arbitral situs might dispense
with any pre-enforcement review of the arbitrator’s decision.
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100.
See, e.g., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW art. 34; N.C.P.C. art. 1502 (Fr.); ZPO art.
1059 (F.R.G.); LDIP art. 190 (1989) (Switz.); 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000). While the Swiss
statute does not enumerate bias explicitly, other bases for vacatur (such as lack of due
process or violation of public policy) serve to address arbitrator prejudice. In some cases
“public policy” is added as a ground for vacatur. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, art.
34(2)(b)(ii); N.C.P.C. art. 1502(5) (Fr.); ZPO, art. 1059(2)2.b (F.R.G.); LDIP art.
190(2)(e) (1989) (Switz.). See generally William W. Park, Why Courts Review Arbitral
Awards, in RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT UND STREITERLEDIGUNG IM 21.
JAHRHUNDERT: LIBER AMICORUM KARL-HEINZ BÖCKSTIEGEL 595 (R. Briner et al., eds.,
2001).
101.
See Arbitration Act, 1996, § 69 (Eng.); William W. Park, The Interaction of
Courts and Arbitrators in England, 1 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 54 (1998), reprinted in 13 INT’L
ARB. REP. 21 (June 1998).
102.
See discussion of Harris v. Parker and related cases, discussed infra note
145 and accompanying text.
103.
See Arbitration Act, 1996, § 69 (Eng.) (permitting exclusion of appeal on
questions of English law).
104.
See discussion of Switzerland’s arbitration regime infra notes 239-44 and
accompanying text.
105.
See discussion of vacatur for “manifest disregard of the law” supra notes 3239 and accompanying text. Moreover, Swiss cantonal law has long allowed awards to
be set aside for “arbitrariness,” defined to include “evident violations of law or equity.”
See CONCORDAT SUISSE SUR L’ARBITRAGE art. 36(f) (1969) (Switz.).
106.
See also W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION 113, 116 (1992) (distinguishing between “primary”
and “secondary” control). See generally W. LAURENCE CRAIG, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION, 28.03 (3d ed. 2000).

The proper extent of judicial review of awards at the arbitral
situs has been the subject of lively debate between those favoring a
“delocalized” regime with little or no judicial scrutiny of international
arbitration and advocates of a more territorial approach that gives
greater leeway to courts to monitor arbitrations conducted within
their jurisdiction. 107 Some countries have deliberately reduced the
impact of local law on international arbitration. 108
The trend toward delocalization does not mean that courts at the
place of arbitration should never review awards. The prospect of no
court scrutiny at the arbitral situs is almost certain to affect
adversely the victims of defective arbitrations, the health of
international arbitration, and in some cases the interests of the
reviewing state itself. 109 After the fact, of course, the winner will
reject extensive court intervention, while the loser will see appeal as
a less appalling prospect. However, at the time the arbitration clause
is signed, before the results of any arbitration are known, the
existence of basic procedural safeguards will enhance rather than
diminish the arbitral process.
3. Efficiency
Although no system of judicial review will be completely foolproof
(fools being quite ingenious), common sense suggests that arbitrator
misconduct is less likely when questionable behavior is subject to
public scrutiny relatively soon after the proceedings. 110 Situs review
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107.
See also William W. Park, Lex Loci Arbitri and International Commercial
Arbitration, 32 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 21, 22-47 (1983); William W. Park, Duty and
Discretion in International Arbitration, 93 AM. J. INT’L LAW 805, 808-13 (1999); Jan
Paulsson, Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration, 32 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 53, 53-61 (1983); cf. Philippe Fouchard, La Portée internationale de l’annulation de
la sentence arbitrale dans son pays d’origine, 1997 REV. ARB. 329, 351-52 (1997);
Francis Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in LIBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 157 (P.
Sanders ed., 1967), reprinted in 2 ARB. INT’L 241, 254-61 (1986).
108.
Until 1989, for example, arbitrations in Switzerland were subject to the
Intercantonal Arbitration Concordat, which in Article 24 directs arbitrators to fill
procedural gaps by reference to Swiss federal law. By contrast, analogous provisions of
the current Swiss international arbitration law contain no such rule, but permit the
parties to agree upon the rules of procedure, either directly or by reference to the rules
of an arbitration institution or a national procedural law of their choice.
109.
This conclusion assumes an honest judiciary. An absence of situs review
might be preferable in parts of the world lacking a tradition of judicial independence,
where the business community may prefer to take its chances with potential arbitrator
misbehavior as the lesser of two evils. In practice, the risk of corrupt judges is best
addressed through the market, by the parties’ informed choice of the arbitral situs.
110.
For example, the prospect of judicial review is likely to sensitize arbitrators
to the potential benefit in allowing testimony from a witness they might otherwise not
wish to hear. Whether the expense of procedural fairness is justified will depend on the
facts of each case. Every additional witness costs time and money. Equilibrium in
judicial review requires constant sensitivity to the competing concerns of winners and
losers. For divergent analyses of the effect of procedural safeguards on arbitration,
compare generally Eric Posner, Arbitration and the Harmonization of International
Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 647 (1999) with Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to

usually occurs immediately after the award is rendered, when
documents and witnesses are more readily available and recollections
have not become stale.
By promoting confidence that arbitration will not be a lottery of
erratic results, situs review also furthers respect for awards outside
the country in which the arbitration occurs. Without a right to have
procedurally unfair awards vacated at the situs, victims of procedural
irregularity must prove an award’s illegitimate character de novo
wherever it might be presented for recognition, running from country
to country to oppose invalid decisions. 111 For the defendant, this
might mean greater difficulty in resisting asset attachment in
multiple jurisdictions where property is located. The claimant would
face the equally daunting task of showing that the defective award
should not bar subsequent arbitral proceedings. 112
Perhaps the best evidence of business community desire for court
scrutiny at the arbitral situs lies in Belgium’s failed experiment in
mandatory “non-review” of awards. 113 Hoping that a completely
laissez-faire system would attract arbitration, in 1985 Belgium
eliminated all motions to vacate awards in disputes between foreign
parties. 114 Contrary to expectations, business managers turned out to
be unimpressed by the new system. 115 Consequently, in 1998 the
Belgian legislature enacted a new statute that now leaves a safety
net of judicial review as the default rule. 116

Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: A Legal Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209
(2000).
111.
This concern lay at the heart of France’s international arbitration decree,
promulgated after court decisions held that French judges lacked power to vacate
awards made in international arbitrations. By allowing award annulment for
procedural irregularity, excess of authority and violation of public policy, N.C.P.C. art.
1502 (Fr.) now addresses fears that a complete absence of judicial control might lead
foreign courts to hesitate to enforce French awards. Décret No. 81-500, May 12, 1981,
1981 J. OFFICIEL RÉP. FRANÇAISE 1398-1406, in effect reversing Gen. Nat’l Maritime
Transp. Co. v. Société Götaverken Arendal, Feb. 21, 1980, Cour d’appel de Paris, REV.
ARB., 1980, 524 and AKSA v. Norsolor, Dec. 9, 1980, Cour d’appel de Paris, 1981 REV.
ARB., 1981, 306; 20 I.L.M. 883.
112.
See Hilmarton v. OTV, Cour de cassation, REV. ARB. June 10, 1997, 376 (an
award vacated in Switzerland granted exequatur in France). For earlier decisions in
the Hilmarton matter, see Cour d’appel de Paris, REV. ARB. 1993, 300, confirmed by
Cour de cassation, REV. ARB. 1994, 327 (recognizing the vacated award) and Cour
d’appel de Versailles, REV. ARB. 1995, 639 (upholding a decision by the Tribunal de
grande instance de Nanterre recognizing a second award rendered after annulment of
the award recognized earlier in France).
113.
See discussion infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
114.
See CODE JUDICIAIRE art. 1717(4) (Belg.) (as enacted in 1985, before
amendment of May 19, 1998, effective August 17, 1998).
115.
See Bernard Hanotiau & Guy Block, La loi du 19 mai 1998 modificant la
législation belge relative à l’arbitrage, 16 ASA BULL. 528, 532 (1998).
116.
So far there seems to be little reliable indication of how the business
community has received this change, particularly in light of arbitration’s

4. Vitality of National Substantive Law
In addition to efficiency arguments discussed above, some
countries have also adopted merits review of awards to foster the
development and stability of the forum’s substantive law. By their
public nature, court cases often create behavioral rules to guide
business conduct outside a particular dispute. 117 Mandatory judicial
review of awards on the legal merits of the case thus fertilizes legal
development by creating a publicly available “legal capital” of new
principles to meet changing commercial circumstances. 118 Concerns
about the development of substantive law once led England to restrict
waiver of appeal on points of English law in so-called “special
category” arbitrations related to insurance, commodity contracts and
admiralty questions. 119 While arbitration also creates precedent
through reasoned awards published in sanitized form, 120 such lex
mercatoria is arguably less accessible than a court case given the
duty of confidentiality covering much arbitration. 121
The history of securities arbitration in the United States has
illustrated the utility of such review. Following the United States
Supreme Court decision to uphold the arbitrability of customer claims

confidentiality. Article 1717(4) of the Belgian Judicial Code provides that any challenge
to awards must be made through an explicit statement.
117.
Under the “public law model” of litigation, cases guide future transactions
of non-litigants. See Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False
Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L.
REV. 1273, 1293-98 (1995). For discussion of analogous notions in connection to
resolution of disputes arising from internet sales, see Michael Schneider & Christopher
Kuner, Dispute Resolution in International Electronic Commerce, 14 J. INT’L ARB. 5
(Sept. 1997) at http://www.disputes.net/cyberweek2001/intereleccomerce.htm (last
visited Aug. 31, 2003).
118.
In the United States, one influential proponent of this perspective argues
that the law should discourage settlement as well as arbitration agreements. See Owen
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085-87 (1984).
119.
See Arbitration Act, 1979 § 4(1) (Eng.) (abrogated in 1996) (prohibiting
exclusion of appeal on the merits of a case unless either the contract was explicitly
subject to a legal system other than English law or the exclusion was concluded after
the arbitration began). The drafters of England’s 1979 Arbitration Act operated on the
assumption that the law of England should have preeminence in the restricted areas,
to be maintained by new judgments covering new commercial controversies.
“Commodity contract” was defined to include agreements for the sale of goods on
English commodity exchanges. Maritime questions were defined as claims falling
within the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court. See generally William W. Park,
Judicial Supervision of Transnational Commercial Arbitration, 21 HARV. INT’L L.J. 87,
100 (1980).
120.
See generally 1 ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1971-85 (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves
Derains eds., 1990); 2 ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1986-90 (Sigvard Jarvin et al. eds., 1994);
3 ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1991-95 (Jean-Jacques Arnaldez et al. eds., 1997).
121.
See generally William W. Park, Control Mechanisms in the Development of
a Modern Lex Mercatoria, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION 143, 165-66
(Thomas Carbonneau ed., 1990) (rev. 1998).

against brokerage houses, 122 there has been a marked decrease in
court decisions addressing broker-customer relations, resulting in a
freeze of the relevant law. 123
On balance, merits review would clearly not be appropriate for
an international arbitration statute, at least not as a default rule. In
international arbitration, the parties’ interest in procedural
neutrality would almost always outweigh any benefits derived from
using commercial disputes to develop substantive law. 124 Moreover,
the argument for substantive merits review is strongest when the law
of the situs governs the relevant contract, which is much less
frequent in international rather than domestic contracts. 125
V. THE DEVIL IN THE DETAILS: POSSIBLE CONTOURS OF NEW FAA
PROVISIONS
A. Optimal Judicial Review for International Arbitration
An optimum legal framework for international arbitration would
limit court scrutiny to narrow review standards, regardless of
whatever judicially-administered anti-abuse measures might be
appropriate for domestic cases. The best default rule for judicial
review of international awards gives losers a right to challenge
awards only for excess of authority and basic procedural unfairness
(bias or denial of an opportunity to present one’s case), but not the
merits of the case. 126
If the substance of a dispute could regularly be second-guessed
by judges, arbitration would become no more than foreplay to
litigation. A century and a half ago, the U.S. Supreme Court refused
to allow an award vacatur for mistake of fact or law, noting that to do
so “would make an award the commencement, not the end, of
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122.
See Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 222-24 (1987)
(fraud claims under Exchange Act § 10b and Rule 10b-5); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (Securities Act § 12(2) claims).
123.
See Alan R. Palmiter, SECURITIES REGULATION § 11.2.5, at 366 (2d ed.
2002).
124.
The negative effect of the law being developed through awards rather than
cases is more worrisome with respect to consumer transactions, where awards
traditionally do not state reasons (at least in the United States) and are not published.
125.
While the law of the arbitral situs does sometimes govern cross-border
contracts, more often the dispute resolution clause represents a compromise, with
language clauses such as “Arbitration in Geneva under English law” providing for
arbitration in one country under the law of another.
126.
As discussed infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text, proposal of the
“fairness” model for judicial scrutiny of awards as a default rule does not mean that
“merits review” should not be added on an optional basis.

litigation.” 127 On occasion this may result in what the Second Circuit
once called “looser approximations” of rights than those available in
court. 128
Limited review, however, does not mean no review at all. Few
commercial actors would want to buy into a system with no prospect
for rectifying gross procedural unfairness. In agreeing to arbitrate,
business managers generally assume the risk that arbitrators may
“get it wrong” on the substance of the dispute but do not bargain for
denial of fundamental due process. When one side regrets its bargain
to arbitrate after the award is rendered, courts should maintain a
relatively hands-off approach that balances the interests of winners
and losers. 129 Normally, judicial intervention is justified only to
promote the basic integrity of the process and the arbitrators’ respect
for the contours of their mission. 130
A statute for international arbitration should exclude consumer
and employment contracts, at least below certain statutorily defined
limits. 131 Such a “carve out” would reduce the type of conflict that has
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127.
See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1855). In Burchell, a New York
merchant succeeded in ruining the business of an Illinois store owner through
oppressive lawsuits, and by having the store owner arrested on charges of dishonesty
and perjury. To resolve the differences between them, the parties agreed to arbitration
(called “arbitrament” in the agreement) by a three member panel that awarded
damages which effectively wiped away the debt of the ill-treated Illinoisan. In
reversing a circuit court vacatur of the award, the Supreme Court provided a succinct
précis of the proper scope of judicial review in arbitration:
If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of the
arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not
set it aside for error, either in law or fact. A contrary course would be a
substitution of the judgment of the chancellor [the judiciary] in place of the
judges chosen by the parties, and would make an award the commencement,
not the end, of litigation.
Id.

128.
Am. Almond Prods. v. Consol. Pecan Sales, 144 F. 2d 448, 451 (2d. Cir.
1944) (Hand, J.) (confirming an award for breach of contract in the sale of pecans
where arbitrators had awarded damages even without evidence on market price).
129.
A dissent by Justice Holmes commented that “[t]he most enlightened
judicial policy is to let people manage their own business in their own way, unless the
ground for interference is very clear.” Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220
U.S. 373, 386 (1911).
130.
The text of the law, of course, must be read in the context of its application.
Even a statute that allows challenge only for defects related to procedural regularity
may allow wiggle room for an overzealous judge to examine a dispute’s legal merits
under the guise of correcting arbitrator excess of authority. For an English perspective
on the relationship between error of law and excess of jurisdiction, see ALFRED T.
DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF THE LAW 74 (1979) (“Whenever a tribunal goes wrong in
law it goes outside the jurisdiction conferred on it and its decision is void.”). See also
Pearlman v. Keepers and Governors of Harrow School, 3 W.L.R. 736, 743 (Eng. C.A.
1978) (“The distinction between an error which entails absence of jurisdiction and an
error made within jurisdiction is [so] fine . . . that it is rapidly being eroded.”).
131.
The statute might also exclude agreements with small businesses.
However, as Rudyard Kipling might have written, this question involves other stories
for another day. For the time being it might be placed in a box of thoughts labeled
“awaiting further light.”

sometimes arisen when international arbitration statutes were not
clear about the scope of their coverage. 132
The UNCITRAL Model Law might serve as a useful starting
point for developing grounds for judicial review of awards in an
international dispute, 133 subject to several modifications. Suggested
language for a new FAA Chapter is set forth in the Appendix,
incorporating appropriate portions of the Model Law.
First, vacatur on grounds of “public policy” remains highly
problematic, principally because this chameleon-like concept risks
misapplication when refracted through parochial cultural lenses. 134
While public policy analysis is unavoidable when judges seize
property, such a malleable notion may not be necessary when
enforcement is not requested. 135 By contrast, procedural defects such
as excess of authority and denial of the right to be heard, being more
universal in nature, lend themselves less to disruptive application. 136
Admittedly, some public policy violations will call for judicial
action. If an award rendered in Boston grants damages for the sale of
illegal arms to a terrorist organization, a court in Massachusetts
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132.
See Meglio v. Société V2000, Cour de cassation, 1997 REV. ARB. 537 (note E.
Gaillard); 1998 REV. CRIT. DR. INT’L PRIVÉ 87 (note V. Heuzé) (holding that French
resident’s purchase of limited series Jaguar escaped restrictions on consumer
arbitration).
133.
Article 34 of the Model Law allows award vacatur for (i) invalidity of the
agreement, (ii) lack of proper notice, (iii) excess of arbitral jurisdiction, (iv) irregular
composition of the arbitral tribunal, (v) non-arbitrable subject-matter and (vi) conflict
with public policy.
134.
See, e.g., Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co.,
484 F. Supp. 1063, 1068-69 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (vacating award that applied French
interest rate to international contract).
135.
If German and Italian companies choose New York to arbitrate a dispute
that has no effect in the United States, it might be best to leave to European judges the
task of deciding whether the award is compatible with whatever public policy might be
represented by usury laws or currency controls.
136.
Other than when raised before the arbitral tribunal itself, public policy may
be considered by courts not only when asked to vacate, confirm or recognize an award,
but also when asked to enforce an agreement to arbitrate. In the last of these contests
public policy is usually discussed as “subject matter arbitrability.” For two recent
attempts in England to address public policy in the context of international commercial
arbitration, see Westacre Investments v. Jugoimport, 1999 Q.B. 740 (Eng.), aff’g Q.B.,
December 19, 1997, 3 W.L.R. 770 (Eng.) and Soleimany v. Soleimany, C.A., 3 W.L.R.
811 (1998) (Eng.). See also Homayoon Arfazadeh, L’ordre public du fond et l’annulation
des sentences arbitrales internationales en Suisse, REV. SUISSE DR. INT. & DR. EUROPÉEN
223 (1995). See generally Audley Sheppard & Nagla Nassar, Co-Rapporteurs, Final
Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, in
INT’L LAW ASS’N, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
PROCEEDINGS OF NEW DELHI CONFERENCE (2002), available at http://www.ilahq.org/pdf/int%international%20commercial%20arbitration/international%20commerci
al%20arbitration%202002.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2003). The report states that
award non-recognition may be justified for violation of “international public policy”
(emphasis added), which is described in the negative as something other than policy
“common to many States” and as “narrower in scope than domestic public policy.” Id.

would have a hard time resisting vacatur of the decision. 137 The issue
is not so much the existence of a properly-conceived escape hatch but
the temptation to invoke the concept abusively on parochial grounds.
One option might be to adopt explicitly the French distinction
between public policy applicable to domestic and international
cases. 138 The latter concept, referred to as international public policy,
would be constituted not by any supra-national norms, but rather by
the policy applied by national courts to cross-border transactions with
no direct impact on the forum.
Second, arbitrator bias and corruption should be included
explicitly as grounds for annulment. The Model Law contains no
reference to annulment for partiality, and thus public policy must be
pressed into service to deal with defective awards rendered by biased
arbitrators. A direct approach to the problem would be superior.
Sensibly, Scotland’s adoption of the Model Law contains special
provisions in this regard. 139
Finally, litigants might be given an explicit statutory option to
contract into review on the legal and factual merits of the dispute. On
exclusion, American courts have traditionally taken the position that
parties may not dispense with the minimum standard of review
provided by the FAA. 140 However, circuits are divided on whether
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137.
Similarly, a U.S. judge might vacate an award implementing religious or
racial discrimination even if allowed under the applicable foreign law.
138.
See N.C.P.C. art. 1502(5) (Fr.). While both international and domestic
public policy are creatures of French courts, the latter addresses policies relevant only
in an internal context. The former implicates cross-border rather than purely French
interests. Thus an international commercial dispute may be arbitrable even though the
principal contract from which it arises violates French domestic public policy.
Examples of violations of international public policy include procedural fraud
(falsifying documents) and improper extension of time limits for rendering an award.
See also BERNARD AUDIT, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ § 302 (1991) (suggesting that a
better terminology might be “public policy in the sense of private international law”
(ordre public au sense du droit international privé)). See generally HENRI BATIFFOL &
PAUL LAGARDE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ § 363 (8th ed. 1993).
139.
See Law Reform (Misc. Provision) (Scotland Act), 1990, c.40, schedule 7,
art. 34(2)(a)(v) (Eng.) (allowing vacatur if an award “was procured by fraud, bribery or
corruption”).
140.
See, e.g., Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57 (2003) (holding that a
federal court is not deprived if the power to review an award for “manifest disregard of
law” because the parties have provided that the award “shall not be subject to any type
of review or appeal whatsoever”). See also M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH, 87 F.3d
844, 847 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that contract terms purporting to waive judicial
review “merely reflect a contractual intent that the issues joined and resolved in the
arbitration may not be tried de novo in any court”). Only one American decision has
suggested (in ill-reasoned dictum) that there exists a right to discard the minimum
grounds for vacatur under the FAA. See Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Kayser, 257
F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001) (suggesting that parties could “opt out of the FAA’s off-therack vacatur standards”). Surprisingly, the court cited cases (Lapine and its progeny)
relating not to exclusion of review, but to expansion of court scrutiny. Courts in France
have taken a similar approach. Attempts to waive N.C.P.C. art. 1504 were dismissed in
Diseno v. Société Mendes, Cour d’Appel de Paris, Oct. 24, 1994, 1995 REV. ARB. 263.
See generally PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, EMMANUEL GAILLARD & BERTHOLD GOLDMAN,
TRAITÉ DE L’ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL § 1597, at 931 nn.142-46 (1996).

parties to an arbitration clause can by contract expand the judicial
review function. 141 Some allow expansion, 142 while others hold that
the FAA’s grounds for court scrutiny constitute a ceiling as well as a
floor. 143
While some commentators fear that to allow expansion of judicial
review would change the character of arbitration, creditable
arguments exist in favor of freedom of contract on the matter. At
least as between sophisticated parties to an international contract,
the right to elect merits review would seem almost a corollary of the
right to elect courts. The wisdom of providing for judicial review in a
given case is a question quite different from whether the right should
be available. 144
Concerning the parties’ ability to lower the judicial review
standards by excluding all court scrutiny at the situs, the right rule is
less certain. When all parties are from outside the United States the
chances of the award affecting American interests are slim, which
would favor allowing litigants the liberty to eliminate the possibility
of vacatur where the award is rendered. However, an award’s
international currency is likely to be enhanced by some minimum
review at the situs, which supports an argument for American courts
to maintain some power to scrutinize the award for conformity with
basic procedural fairness and public policy of an international nature.
From a treaty perspective, divergent standards for international
and domestic cases would be entirely consonant with American
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141.
See generally Alan Scott Rau, Arbitrability and Judicial Review: A Brief
Rejoinder, 13 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 71 (Mar. 2002); Victoria Holstein, Co-opting the
Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards Through Contract, 12 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP.
276 (Nov. 2001); Christopher R. Drahozal, Standards for Judicial Review of Arbitral
Awards in the United States: Mandatory Rules or Default Rules?, 16 INT’L ARB. REP. 27
(Sept. 2001); William H. Knull & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on International
Arbitration: Is It Time to Offer an Appeal Option?, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 531, 545-47
(2000); Andreas Lowenfeld, Can Arbitration Coexist With Judicial Review?, 3 ADR
CURRENTS 1 (Sept. 1998); Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 225, 246-56 (1997).
142.
See Harris v. Parker College of Chiropractic, 286 F. 3d 790, 793-94 (5th Cir.
2002); Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262, 262 (4th Cir. 1997); Gateway
Techs. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1995); New England
Utils. v. Hydro-Quebec, 10 F. Supp. 2d 53, 62-64 (D. Mass. 1998).
143.
See Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, 935 F.2d 1501,
1505 (7th Cir. 1995); Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential Bache Trade Servs., 391 F3d 987 (9th
Cir. 2003), overruling en banc Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884
(1997); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir. 2001).
144.
Often the advisability of a merits review clause will be evaluated
retroactively, and will depend on whether a party has won or lost the arbitration. One
person’s delay is another’s due process. In Kyocera v. Prudential-Bache, the award
went up to the Court of Appeals again with regard to substantive questions that
included inter alia seller’s knowledge that a contract term had been incorporated into
the final agreement, entitlement to rescission, the effect of insolvency and evidence for
lost profits. See Kyocera, 299 F.3d 769, 773-76 (9th Cir. 2002).

commitments to trading partners. 145 The New York Arbitration
Convention requires recognition of foreign awards on the same
footing as domestic ones 146 but always subject to the condition that
awards vacated at the arbitral situs lose presumptive validity under
the treaty’s enforcement scheme. 147 The Convention leaves each
country free to establish its own grounds for vacating awards made
within its territory. 148 A national arbitration statute may impose
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145.
At least one country has enacted legislation providing that an award
vacated where rendered may lose its enforceability, even if the vacatur occurs after
recognition. See ZPO, § 1061, No. 3 (F.R.G.) (Wird der Schiedsspruch, nachdem er für
vollstreckbar erklärt worden ist, im Ausland aufgehoben, so kann die Aufhebung der
Vollstreckbarerklärung beantragt werden.).
146.
New York Convention art. III. In some cases this deference is conditioned
on a principle of territorial reciprocity, by which foreign awards are enforced only if
rendered in another Convention country. See art. I(3). Thus the winner of an
arbitration in Iran (which to date has not adhered to the Convention) could not use the
Convention to enforce its award in the United States, which has taken the reciprocity
reservation to the Convention’s application.
147.
Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention permits recognition and
enforcement to be denied to awards set aside in the country where made. The treaty’s
French text lends itself to a more forceful interpretation, providing that “recognition
and enforcement will not be refused unless the award . . . was annulled where
rendered” (“La reconnaissance et l’exécution de la sentence ne seront refusées que si la
sentence . . . a été annulée ou suspendue”). The Chinese, Russian and Spanish versions
seem to comport with the permissive English. Thus vacatur at the arbitral situs will
not in all cases uproot the defective decision. Some judges have disregarded
annulments, relying on the Convention’s permissive language (award enforcement
“may” be refused) as well as Article VII which in some circumstances permits national
law to override more restrictive Convention terms. See Chromalloy Aeroservices v.
Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907, 911 (D.D.C. 1996) (enforcing an award vacated in Egypt);
Hilmarton v. OTV, Cour de cassation, June 10, 1997, 1997 REV. ARB. 376 (award
vacated in Switzerland given effect in France). The emerging trend is toward the more
sensible practice of granting comity to foreign annulment decisions. See Baker Marine
Ltd. v. Chevron Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999). See generally Richard W. Hulbert,
Further Observations on Chromalloy: A Contract Misconstrued, a Law Misapplied, and
an Opportunity Foregone, 13 ICSID REV. 124, 144 (Spring 1998); Jan Paulsson, May or
Must Under the New York Convention: An Exercise in Syntax and Linguistics, 14 ARB.
INT’L 227, 229 (1998); William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in International
Arbitration, 93 AM. J. INT’L LAW 805, 811 (1999).
148.
For a suggestion that Article V be amended to reduce the effect of the
arbitral situs, see Kenneth R. Davis, Unconventional Wisdom: A New Look at Articles V
and VII of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 37 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 43, 86 (2002) (proposing that annulment power be limited
to “courts of the country whose law governs the arbitration”). While intriguing and
creative, the proposal would likely be a trap for the unwary creating more problems
than it would solve. When negotiating a contract, the parties rarely insert a reference
to any legal system other than the law intended to govern the merits of the dispute. If
there is any assumption about the lex arbitri it is that this will be the law of the place
of proceedings. For example, if an American company contracted to do construction in
China, the agreement might include reference to Chinese law by virtue of the place of
performance. However, the parties would normally provide for arbitration in some
neutral location such as London in order to reduce the prospect of intervention by
courts of one party. To give annulment power to courts of the country of applicable law
would exacerbate matters. In this connection, in one case a court in New York stayed
an arbitration being conducted in New York until the validity of the agreement to
arbitrate was determined by courts in Venezuela, which had been designated as the

judicial review for whatever grounds the legislators consider
appropriate or for no grounds at all. 149
Characterization of a transaction as international or domestic
might be made according to two criteria: the nature of the
transaction 150 and the parties’ residences. 151 For example, arbitration
would be international if only one side to the dispute is resident in
the United States. 152 An alternative approach would characterize
arbitration as international if the underlying controverted
transaction implicates cross-border trade, finance, and investment. 153
The most sensible approach would seem to be one based on
residence. The special status of international arbitration justifies
itself as a way to promote neutrality in dispute resolution among
commercial actors from different countries. Difficult linguistic and
procedural issues are more likely to arise when business managers
from one nation must sue contracting parties abroad, not when they
have litigation with compatriots concerning goods destined for export.

applicable law. See Pepsico v. Officina Central de Asesoria, 945 F. Supp. 69, 71-72
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) mot. denied, No. 97-7318 and No. 97-7386 (2d Cir. 1997).
149.
By contrast, Article 9 of the European Arbitration Convention (European
Convention on International Arbitration, art. 3, 484 U.N.T.S. 349 (1969)), which
supplements the New York Convention among residents of member states, allows nonrecognition for award annulment only if the annulment was based on standards that
track the first four defenses to foreign award enforcement. Accordingly, courts in
Germany could refuse comity to a French annulment for violation of “international
public policy,” not among the approved defenses. From a policy perspective, this
approach is problematic in its indiscriminate mixing of both good and bad review
standards. Arbitration would be impeded by some grounds for annulments that fall
outside Convention-approved standards. For example, a requirement that all
arbitrators must sign an award would give dissenters a tool to sabotage proceedings.
However, other non-Convention grounds for review (such as monitoring arbitrator bias
and error) might further legitimate interests of the parties and the regulating state.
150.
N.C.P.C. art. 1492 (Fr.) defines arbitration as international if it “implicates
international commerce.” See also FAA § 202 (excluding from the scope of the New
York Convention agreements solely between U.S. citizens unless “the relationship
involves property located abroad or envisages performance or enforcement abroad.” In
Lander v. MMP, this provision was applied to bring within the Convention an
arbitration in New York between two American corporations who had contracted to
distribute shampoo products in Poland. Lander v. MMP, 107 F.3d 476, 477-78 (7th Cir.
1997).
151.
See, e.g., LDIP art. 176, 192 (1989) (Switz.).
152.
Corporate residence might be defined by reference to the place of
incorporation and/or the principal place of business. FAA § 202 employs such a test,
including as a U.S. citizen any corporation which is “incorporated or has its principal
place of business in the United States.” Criteria for determining whether arbitrations
are international are articulated in negative terms, to exclude from the scope of the
New York Convention arbitration agreements “entirely between citizens of the United
States” unless they relate to property, performance or enforcement abroad, or have
some “other reasonable relation” with a foreign country.
153.
Section 1(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law adopts both tests, characterizing
arbitration as international if the parties’ places of business are in different states, or if
the transaction has a connection to a state other than the parties’ places of business. In
addition, the Model Law allows parties to opt to treat their agreement as international.

B. Secondary Matters
In addition to a more sensible framework for judicial review of
arbitral awards, reform is warranted in several other areas that
implicate international transactions: (i) arbitral jurisdiction, (ii) the
role of state law, (iii) judicial deference to the parties’ choice of
arbitral venue, and (iv) election to expand court scrutiny of awards.
While of secondary importance compared with mandatory judicial
review standards, reform in these areas would significantly improve
the climate for international arbitration in the United States.
1. Jurisdictional Determinations
Arbitration is a consensual process. 154 Therefore allocating
jurisdiction between courts and arbitrators remains a vexing problem
with significant implications for arbitral autonomy, efficiency, and
access to justice. The arbitral tribunal’s competence to determine its
own power has been articulated in many countries under the
variegated jurisdictional principle referred to as “compétencecompétence.” 155 The United States lags behind other nations in
articulating how far arbitrators may rule on their authority, either as
a preliminary matter (subject to subsequent court review) or in a
more final and binding way. Confusion has been created by the
“arbitrability dictum” in First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 156
suggesting that in some instances courts must defer to arbitrators’
decisions on their jurisdiction.
The problems of arbitral jurisdiction have been complicated by
questions arising from the so-called “separability” doctrine (by which
the validity of an arbitration clause is tested separately from the
validity of the main contract) 157 and the presumption in favor of
arbitrability which has on occasion resulted in findings of implied
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154.
A distinguished First Circuit judge has recently referred to the
“abecedarian tenent” that a party cannot be forced to arbitrate if it has agreed to do so.
Intergen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F3d 134 (1st Cir. 2003) (Selya, J.). See also Steven Walt,
Decision by Division: The Contractarian Structure of Commercial Arbitration, 51
RUTGERS L. REV. 369, 370-73 (1999).
155.
On the way notions of compétence-compétence vary from country to country,
see William W. Park, The Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan, 12 ARB. INT’L
137, 149-51 (1996); William W. Park, Determining Arbitral Jurisdiction: Allocation of
Tasks Between Courts and Arbitrators, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 133, 140 (1997).
156.
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995). Also see
cases summarized in PaineWebber, Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 596-98 (1st Cir. 1996),
describing the split in the circuits on whether time limits in arbitration rules constitute
jurisdictional prerequisites to be determined by courts.
157.
See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-03
(1967). For a recent decision on the costs and benefits of addressing jurisdiction as a
preliminary issue (with a separate bifurcated decision on the merits) see Aoot Kalmneft
v. Glencore Int’l AG, 2001 WL 82510627, July 2001, High Court of Justice (Q.B.
2001), 1 LLOYD’S L. REP. 128 (2002); 2 All E.R. (Comm.) 577, reprinted in 16 INT’L ARB.
REP. § A (Aug. 2001).

(rather than actual) consent to the arbitration clause. 158 Since no
neutral courts of mandatory international jurisdiction exist to hear
disputes if arbitrators misinterpret their powers, 159 jurisdictional
problems have a higher profile for cross-border transactions, making
it critical for the FAA to provide explicit guidance on separability and
compétence-compétence.
In the event of ambiguity in the contract, different presumptions
would seem to be appropriate depending on whether the case is
domestic or international. In a dispute between two residents of the
United States, U.S. courts would normally be the default forum
expected by the parties. By contrast, in an international transaction
where the choice is not between courts in New York or New Jersey,
but between ICC arbitration in Paris and courts in either Yemen or
Boston, the parties might more logically be presumed to have favored
the neutrality-enhancing choice of Paris arbitration.
Three cases, each decided by the U.S. Supreme Court during the
past year, might serve as a springboard from which to examine how
jurisdictional functions are allocated between courts and arbitrators.
In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds 160 a broker-customer dispute
arose from alleged misrepresentations about the quality of an
investment. The Court gave the arbitrators a green light to determine
whether their power to hear the case was affected by time limits
contained in the arbitration rules. Pacificare Health Systems v.
Book 161 involved a controversy between doctors and managed-healthcare organizations. Here the Court essentially allowed the arbitrators
themselves to determine whether they could grant treble damages in
a RICO claim under an arbitration clause which explicitly denied
them the power to award punitive damages. 162
Finally, a plurality of the Court followed a similar line of
reasoning in Green Tree Financial Corp v. Bazzle, 163 which involved
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158.
See generally Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1 (1983), (enforcing an arbitration clause against a North Carolina hospital). In
Moses H. Cone, the Court required interpretation of arbitration clauses “with a healthy
regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.” Id. at 24. However, the Court has
also stated the presumption in favor of arbitrability should not apply to questions
related to the existence of an arbitrator’s jurisdiction. See First Options, 514 U.S. at
944-46. For examples of the proper approach to separability, compétence-compétence
and presumptions, see Sphere Drake Ins. v. All American Ins., 256 F.3d 587, 590 (7th
Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, J.) (noting that “pieces of paper don’t ‘agree’ to do things”),
Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2000), and Three Valleys
Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 1991).
159.
Cf. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. at 17-25.
160.
Howsam, 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
161.
Pacificare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 123 S. Ct. 1531, rev’g In re Humana
Inc., Managed Care Litigation, 285 F. 3d 971 (11th Cir. 2002).
162.
The physicians had filed claims under RICO (Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.
163.
Green Tree Financial Corp v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003).

an attempt at class action arbitration of disputes arising from
consumer loan agreements. Once again, the Supreme Court punted
the question to the arbitrator himself.
In Howsam v. Dean Witter, 164 the performance of an investment
had proved unsatisfactory, causing the customer to bring an NASD
arbitration claim against her broker. The brokerage firm filed suit in
federal court requesting an injunction, on the ground that the original
investment advice was more than six years old and thus ran afoul of
the “eligibility rule” which requires any arbitration to be brought
within 6 years of the relevant occurrence. 165
Resolving a split among the circuits over who (judge or
arbitrator) decides on “eligibility” requirements, 166 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that jurisdiction was for the court. While paying lip
service to the principle that judges would normally decide gateway
jurisdictional matters unless the parties clearly provided otherwise,
the Court engaged in the presumption that the parties intended for
arbitrators to determine their own jurisdiction with respect to NASD
eligibility requirements. Rightly or wrongly, the Court interpreted
the parties’ intent to include a bargain for the presumed expertise of
the arbitrators in interpreting the NASD Rules. 167
While the Court’s line of reasoning is plausible, the
presumptions about the parties’ intent may be a bit far fetched. If
they agreed that the case is ineligible for arbitration after six (6)
years have elapsed, it is questionable whether one can speak of an
“arbitrator” at all in the seventh year. Moreover, the decision is
disturbing in its failure to distinguish between judicial intervention
before and after the arbitration, which leaves the impression that
arbitrators decide the jurisdictional question free from any
subsequent court scrutiny. One cannot help but wonder whether
arbitration is not serving as a rubbish bin for cases that would
otherwise clog dockets.
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164.
Howsam, 537 U.S. 79 (2002). The unanimous decision was written by
Justice Breyer, with a concurrence by Justice Thomas who decided on the basis that
New York law (applicable to the contract in question) had held that time bars under
the NASD Rules are for arbitrators to decide.
165.
While a brokerage firm in the United States would normally want
arbitration of the merits of a customer dispute (presuming that arbitrators will be more
“reasonable” than juries comprised of individuals sympathetic with the investor), on
jurisdictional questions the financial institutions look for decisions by courts rather
than arbitrators, on the assumption that arbitrators (who get paid for hearing a case)
would be more likely to find jurisdiction. In most cases a finding of ineligibility under
the arbitration rules would mean that the claim would also be time barred in court, due
to the statute of limitations.
166.
See generally William W. Park, Determining Arbitral Jurisdiction:
Allocation of Tasks Between Courts and Arbitrators, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 133 (1997);
reprinted [2000] ADR LAW J. 19 (Mar. 2000).
167.
Howsam, 123 S. Ct. at 593. The court also noted that § 10324 of the NASD
Rules (formerly Rule 35) gave arbitrators power to “interpret and determine the
applicability of all provisions under [the NASD] Code.” Id.

Pacificare Health Systems follows similar lines of reasoning. A
group of doctors had filed a nationwide class action against several
health maintenance organizations, alleging inter alia that the
organizations had conspired to refuse proper reimbursement for
services provided under the health plans to which the physicians had
agreed. The legal basis for the doctors’ action included claims under
RICO, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
allowing awards of treble damages. Unfortunately, however, the
physicians had agreed to resolve disputes through arbitration, and
some of the arbitration agreements were explicit in prohibiting
arbitrators from awarding punitive damages.
In a relatively brief opinion by Justice Scalia, a unanimous U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the health care organizations’ right to compel
arbitration. The key to the Court’s reasoning is its assumption about
the ambiguity of the term “punitive damages” and the nature of
treble damages in the RICO statute. Since it would be “mere
speculation” to presume that arbitrators might deny themselves the
power to grant punitive damages, the court would not “take upon
itself the authority to decide the antecedent question of how the
ambiguity [concerning punitive damages] is to be resolved.” 168 This
approach invites further questions. Can arbitrators effectively limit
vindication of a public right by the way they interpret a contract? If
so, where is the role for judicial review to insure that arbitration
clauses do not work as a “prospective waiver” of statutory claims? 169
If not, then why let arbitrators address the question? One thing is
certain: the case will mean more work for lawyers and scholars.
A similar approach to arbitral jurisdiction was taken in a U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Green Tree Financial Corp v. Bazzle,
concerning loans used to purchase mobile homes and finance
residential improvements, with allegations that the lender violated
South Carolina’s Consumer Protection Code by neglecting to give
borrowers notice about the right to name their own lawyers and
insurance agents. The interesting plurality decision split 4-1-3-1.
Four Justices concluded that it was for the arbitrator to decide
whether the contracts allowed class action arbitration. One concurred
in the judgment although he would have preferred to affirm the
South Carolina decision that ordered arbitration to proceed as a class
action. Three Justices dissented on the basis that any imposition of
class-wide arbitration contravened the parties’ contract, and one
dissented on the ground that the FAA should not apply in state
courts.
Where does all this leave us? The decisions in Howsam,
Pacificare and Bazzle are plausible. However, the presumptions about
________________________________________________________________
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169.

Pacificare, 123 S. Ct. at 1535-36.
See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 6145, 637 n.19 (1985).

the parties’ intent may not be self-evident. The heart of the
jurisdictional dilemma is that language, while often ambiguous, is not
infinitely plastic. Some contract terms with a jurisdictional
significance may well fall within the spectrum of matters the parties
intended the arbitrator to interpret. Others, however, do not.
Much of the work in allocating tasks between courts and
arbitrators will turn on characterization of the analytic task. One
formulation might ask, “May persons who call themselves arbitrators
determine their jurisdiction free from judicial review?” An affirmative
answer would be conceptually problematic, implying that a piece of
paper labeled “award” could be enforced without regard to the
legitimate mission of the alleged arbitrator. An alternate phraseology
could pose the jurisdictional question differently: “By agreeing to
arbitrate, did the parties intend to waive their right to have courts
determine a particular jurisdictional precondition to arbitration (such
as time bars) or a particular substantive question (such as liability for
costs of litigation begun in breach of the arbitration agreement)?”
Answering the latter question would require a factual inquiry into
the parties’ true intent.
2. The Impact of State Law
The U.S. Supreme Court has not always explained the proper
relationship of federal and state arbitration law. 170 Several steps
might improve things. First, courts should be directed to look
exclusively to federal arbitration law in any transaction involving
international commerce. Second, the FAA could provide a statutory
definition of the grounds on which an arbitration clause might be
found revocable or otherwise invalid. 171 Third, appeal should be
allowed when awards arguably falling under the New York
Convention have been remanded to state courts.
A bit of background makes things more clear. The FAA is an
anomaly. While the Act creates a body of federal law binding on
states, 172 its enforcement provisions speak only of federal district
courts 173 and create no general basis for federal court jurisdiction. 174
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170.
See generally Alan Scott Rau, Does State Arbitration Law Matter At All?,
ADR CURRENTS 19 (June 1998).
171.
See LOI FÉDÉRALE SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ [LDIP], discussed
supra notes 71, 77, 81 and accompanying text.
172.
See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (involving a
California franchise act). Some questions may still be reserved for the states. See, e.g.,
Muao v. Grosvenor Props., 99 Cal. App. 4th 1085, 1092-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(rejecting application of FAA § 16 providing rules for taking concerning appeals from
orders inter alia compelling arbitration, refusing to stay litigation and vacating
awards).
173.
Moreover, FAA enforcement provisions speak of federal district courts. To
remedy this problem it has been suggested that 9 U.S.C. § 4 should provide for
enforcement of arbitration agreements in “any” court (rather than the current
reference to a U.S. district court) and should stipulate that proceedings under the FAA
will be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States. See generally Joseph D.

The problem is remedied for international cases through a
provision of the FAA that allows removal to federal court of actions
relating to arbitrations covered by the New York Convention. 175
Difficulties arise when cases are sent back to state courts. Since
remand orders are generally not subject to review, such situations
inhibit the creation of a well developed body of federal law on
Convention coverage. 176
More generally, troubles derive from the U.S. Supreme Court’s
ambivalence toward the role of state arbitration law. In Volt v.
Stanford the Court held that an arbitration in California could be
stayed under provisions of state law, 177 reasoning that by the
contractual choice-of-law clause the parties had incorporated
California arbitration law into their agreement to arbitrate. However,
six years later, the same Court in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton 178 upheld an arbitral award for punitive damages,
notwithstanding that the relevant choice-of-law clause called for
application of New York law, which prohibits arbitrators from
awarding punitive damages.
Squaring these two decisions is not easy. 179 While states cannot
make implementation of arbitration agreements more difficult than
other contractual commitments, 180 state law generally governs the
Becker, Fixing the Federal Arbitration Act by the Millennium, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 75
(1997).
174.
See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26
n.32 (1983). Except in international cases, federal courts do not have jurisdiction to
hear a dispute about arbitration unless the dispute raises a question of federal law or
implicates the court’s diversity jurisdiction over disputes between citizens of different
states or between a U.S. citizen and an alien. The FAA itself does not create subject
matter jurisdiction. See PCS 2000 LP v. Romulus Telecomm., Inc., 148 F.3d 32, 35-36
(1st Cir. 1998); Kasap v. Folger Nolan Fleming & Douglas, 166 F.3d 1243, 1248 (D.C.
Cir. 1999). The existence of a federal question has been found in an allegation that the
arbitrator “manifestly disregarded” federal securities law. See Greenberg v. Bear,
Stearns & Co., 220 F. 3d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 2000). For a recent case on giving broad scope
to the concept of actions that “relate to” the New York Convention, see Beiser v.
Weyler, 284 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2002) (discussing an arbitration related to a contract for
oil and gas exploration in Hungary).
175.
9 U.S.C. § 205 (2003).
176.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2003) (creating an exception only for civil rights
cases covered by § 1443). On remand of cases that raise international issues, see
generally Beiser v. Weyler, 284 F. 3d 665 (5th Cir. 2002), Severonickel v. Gaston
Reymenants, 115 F.3d 265, 265 (4th Cir. 1997), and Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 119 F.3d 619 (8th Cir. 1997).
177.
Volt v. Stanford, 489 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1989).
178.
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 58-64 (1995).
179.
One way to reconcile the cases is to characterize California policy as less
anti-arbitration than that of New York. California only stayed arbitration, while New
York prohibited punitive damage claims from being arbitrated.
180.
In Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto, the Court struck down a Montana
“notice requirement” that said arbitration clauses had to be in capital letters on the
first page of the contract. See Doctors Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996).
See also Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1119-21 (1st Cir. 1989); Allied-

matter of whether and what two contracting parties agreed to
arbitrate. 181 The power of states to affect the validity of arbitration
clauses derives from FAA Section 2, which provides that an
arbitration agreement is valid “save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 182 While the text
itself does not specify whether “at law or in equity” refers to state or
federal law, the absence of any federal common law of contracts has
generally led courts to look to state law to determine grounds for
revocation. 183
Consequently, state arbitration statues now come into play when
their provisions are perceived to be in harmony with the policies
underlying federal law, 184 particularly on ancillary matters such as
authority to administer oaths. 185 However, ascertaining the existence
of harmony or conflict between federal and state norms is not always
an easy task. For example, in the United States, no firm consensus
exists on whether the FAA is consistent with state measures that
authorize interim relief in arbitration 186 and consolidation of
different proceedings that present similar questions of law and
fact. 187
Bruce Terminex v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 267 (1995); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
181.
Cook Chocolate Co. v. Salomon, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 1177, 1182 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
182.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2003) (noting that the existence of an arbitration agreement is
determined by state contract principles).
183.
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). The
Court added a qualification to the effect that “courts should not assume that the
parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability [i.e., jurisdiction] unless there is “clea[r] and
unmistakabl[e]” evidence that they did so.” Id. Some authorities argue that
enforcement of international arbitration agreements under Article II of the New York
Convention is subject to the law agreed upon by the parties (compare provisions under
Convention Article V(1)(a) regarding non-recognition of awards), or to an international
standard that incorporates only “internationally recognized defenses” to contract
enforcement such as duress, fraud and waiver. See Rhône Méditerranée Compagnia
Francese di Assicurazioni e Riassicurazoni v. Achille Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 53 (3d Cir.
1983) (holding arbitration clause valid notwithstanding possible invalidity under
Italian law).
184.
For example, an arbitrator’s authorization to administer oaths derives from
Uniform Arbitration Act § 7.
185.
See U.A.A. § 7(a) (2003).
186.
Some courts reason that by bargaining for arbitration the parties have
implicitly excluded intervention by national courts until an award is rendered, while
others view pre-award attachment as a way to maximize the efficiency of the arbitral
process consistent with the parties’ presumed intent. See Cooper v. Ateliers de la
Motobecane S.A., 57 N.Y.2d 408, 414-16 (1982), where pre-award attachment permitted
by state legislation did not withstand a challenge based on inconsistency with the New
York Convention. Compare McCreary Tire & Rubber v. CEAT, 501 F.2d 1032, 1038 (3d
Cir. 1974) (pre-award attachment denied) with Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex,
451 F. Supp. 1044, 1053-54 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (pre-award attachment allowed). See
generally David E. Wagoner, Interim Relief in International Arbitration, 51 DISP. RES.
J. 68 (Oct. 1996).
187.
While the FAA does not authorize forced consolidation of proceedings, see
United Kingdom v. Boeing, 998 F.2d 68, 71-73 (2d Cir. 1993) (denying consolidation of
two different arbitrations between the British government, on the one hand, and

Federal preemption complicates matters for consumers in
particular. The U.S. Supreme Court has struck down on federalism
grounds several state initiatives to protect weaker parties against illadvised agreements to arbitrate. 188 State law would normally govern
the formation and scope of an arbitration agreement as it determines
the validity of most contracts in the absence of a federal common
law. 189 However, the so-called “pro-arbitration” policy of the FAA 190
(better conceived as a pro-contract policy) has been interpreted to
preempt states from singling out arbitration clauses for threshold
validity limitations more onerous than those imposed on other
contracts. Thus, state arbitration statutes fill gaps in federal law only
if consistent with the latter’s general purposes. 191
One potential avenue of escape for states skeptical of arbitration
has recently been suggested by the Supreme Court of Montana. In
refusing to enforce an arbitration clause against a nonagenarian
widow allegedly defrauded by her investment adviser, 192 the court
focused on the waiver of rights guaranteed by the Montana
Constitution (access to courts and trial by jury) implicit in
arbitration. Such waiver was held to have been outside the customer’s
“reasonable expectation” and thus invalid against the weaker party in
an adhesion contract. 193 Thus, the Montana court struck down the
agreement not by singling out arbitration, but by upholding access to

Boeing and Textron on the other). State law at the arbitral situs has been applied to
permit consolidation. See also New England Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855
F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1988) (involving a Massachusetts provision permitting courts to
order consolidation of related arbitrations).
188.
See Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (discussed supra note
182 and accompanying text); see also Allied Bruce Terminex v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265
(1995) (striking down Alabama statute that invalidated pre-dispute arbitration
agreements), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the FAA applied to the “full
limits of Congress’ commerce clause power” and was not limited to transactions
“contemplating interstate commerce.” Id.
189.
See Cook Chocolate Co. v. Salomon, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 1177, 1182 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
190.
See generally Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1 (1983).
191.
The decision to apply the FAA in state courts might well be characterized
as good policy but very bad history. While it can certainly be argued that the United
States should have a national (rather than simply federal) arbitration law, there is
little evidence that Congress so intended in 1925 when passing the FAA. See IAN R.
MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 139-47 (1992) (noting that the transformation
of the FAA “occurred with singularly little debate and with virtually no democratic
input, not even the elite pressure group politics often passing for democracy these
days”); see also Allied-Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (accepting that the FAA applied in state courts for reasons of stare
decisis). Justice O’Connor stated, “I have no doubt that Congress could enact, in the
first instance, a federal arbitration statute that displaces most state arbitration law.
But I also have no doubt that, in 1925, Congress enacted no such statute.” Id.
192.
See Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 310 Mont. 123, 135 (2002).
193.
Id. at 132-33.

constitutional rights generally, under principles of law applicable to
all contracts. 194
One might fear that a pro-arbitration policy will result in overly
broad findings of implied consent in consumer cases. Cases taking
such an approach would misconstrue the FAA’s pro-arbitration
policy. 195 At most what can be said is that ambiguous contract
language should be presumed to permit arbitration, as was done in
Mastrobuono, 196 which is quite different from implying an agreement
to arbitrate based only on a form which in the fine print recites a duty
to arbitrate. 197
Preemption has been intertwined with questions of party intent
in the context of choice-of-law clauses. The question has often been
whether contractual selection of state law was intended to encompass
arbitration procedures as well as substantive law. 198 Similar
questions arise when the contract choice-of-law clauses stipulate the
law of a non-U.S. jurisdiction. 199
3. Arbitral Venue
________________________________________________________________
194.
Id. at 133-34.
195.
The difference between actual and implied consent in the context of
arbitration clauses might be illustrated with the example of a bank loan and mortgage.
The hopeful home owner will likely have understood and actually agreed to the interest
rate and loan term. Less plausible is that the borrower will read, let alone understood,
the standard terms in the mortgage. Yet by signing the forms the borrower will be
deemed to have impliedly consented to the entirety of the conditions. It is questionable
whether consent to arbitrate should be implied when arbitration clauses fall into the
latter category.
196.
In Mastrobuono, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the arbitrators’ right to
award punitive damages to a brokerage customer notwithstanding New York
substantive law, thus illustrating that the presumption in favor of arbitrability can
also work in favor of the consumer. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S.
52, 58-61 (1995).
197.
Some would go further to argue that renunciation of the right to go to court
is too serious a matter to be implied, and that consumer arbitration clauses should be
enforced only if the consumer was aware and informed of the choice of forum.
Admittedly the law on court selection clauses sometimes runs counter to such
consumer protection arguments. In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, a couple from
the State of Washington purchased a cruise ticket to Mexico. Carnival Cruise Lines,
499 U.S. 585, 586 (1991). After the unfortunate Mrs. Shute slipped in the ship’s galley,
the couple filed suit in Washington for injuries and loss of consortium. Id. at 588. The
boilerplate clauses attached to the ticket provided for litigation in Florida. Id. at 58788. The Court held that a non-negotiated jurisdiction clause could not be refused
enforcement solely on the ground that it was not the subject of bargaining. Id. at 59095.
198.
For an excellent tour d’horizon of the problem, see Note, An Unnecessary
Choice of Law: Volt, Mastrobuono and Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 2250 (2002), suggesting that the perceived conflict between Volt and
Mastrobuono can be reconciled by understanding the FAA to preempt state arbitration
law only if (i) the parties’ agreement is ambiguous and (ii) the state law would defeat
FAA policies. Id. at 2269.
199.
See New England Utils. v. Hydro-Quebec, 10 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55, 63-65 (D.
Mass. 1998).

In international arbitration, the traditional assumption has been
that judges will hold the parties to their agreement on arbitral situs,
both as the place for the proceedings and the forum for any
annulment action. A recent line of cases, however, has called this
principle into question. First, U.S. courts have compelled arbitration
outside the contractually-selected venue. 200 Second, courts have
suggested that awards may be vacated other than where made, 201
encouraging a race to the courthouse to gain precedence with a “firstfiled” motion. 202
Both lines of cases rest on a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court
allowing an award to be set aside at a place other than the arbitral
situs. In Cortez Byrd Chips Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction
Company 203 the Court held that an award rendered in Alabama could
________________________________________________________________
200.
See Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Global Transport Systems Inc., 197 F. Supp.
2d 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), justified on the basis of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Const. Co., 529 U.S. 203, 203 (2000) (discussed
infra notes 203-06 and accompanying text). When an insurer brought an action against
an insured barge owner, seeking a declaration that it had no obligation to indemnify,
the insured filed motion to compel arbitration in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Id. at 1.
Nevertheless, the court, deemed itself to have discretion to compel arbitration in New
York under FAA § 4. Id. at 3; see also Textile Unlimited Inc. v. A.B.M.H. & Co. Inc.,
240 F. 3d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 2001), permitting an action in California to enjoin
arbitration at the contractually-designated situs in Georgia.
201.
In Vulcan Chemical Technologies, Inc. v. Barker, the Western District
Court of Virginia vacated an award made in California and attempted to enjoin
confirmation proceedings in California state court. Vulcan Chemical Technologies, Inc.
v. Barker, 297 F.3d 332, 337-38 (4th Cir. 2002). The Fourth Circuit declared that
Virginia court had jurisdiction to hear the action to vacate the California award,
although in the instant case the Court of Appeals held that the court in Virginia should
have exercised discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction in light of the
California action under principles announced in Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800 (1976). Vulcan Chemical, 297 F.3d at 340; see also Smart v.
Sunshine Potato Flakes, 2002 WL 31235498 (8th Cir. 2002) (North Dakota
confirmation of award made in New Mexico); Theis Research Inc. v. Brown & Bain, 240
F.3d 795, 796 (9th Cir. 2001) (directing the California district court to assess the
validity of an award made in the District of Columbia in the context of motion to
vacate).
202.
On the “first to file” rule, see Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, Inc.,
765 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir. 1985), stating that in cases of concurrent federal
jurisdiction, “the first court in which jurisdiction attaches has priority to consider the
case.” For international transactions, this and related questions are often addressed
under the rubric lis pendens, lis alibi pendens or litispendence. See, e.g., Laurent Lévy
& Elliot Geisinger, Applying the Principle of Litispendence, [2000] INT’L A.L.R. (Issue
4), at N-28.
203.
Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Const. Co., 529 U.S. 203, 203 (2000)
(Souter, J.) (unanimous). The Contractor moved to confirm an award in Alabama, after
the project owner a few days earlier had filed a motion to vacate in Mississippi.
Reversing a decision in the Northern District of Alabama upheld by the Eleventh
Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court gave priority to the first filed motion in Mississippi.
Ironically, the Supreme Court supported its holding in part by stating that a restrictive
reading (limiting vacatur to the award situs) would “preclude any action [in courts of
the United States] to confirm, modify or vacate awards rendered in foreign arbitrations
not covered by [the New York or Panama Conventions].” Id.

be vacated in Mississippi. The FAA venue provisions (making vacatur
available “in and for the district wherein the award was made” 204)
were held to be permissive, thus allowing a motion to vacate in any
district proper under the general venue statute, including the place of
defendant’s residence. 205
Whatever value such a rule might have in domestic arbitration,
it will produce dramatically disagreeable results in an international
context. While such a free-for-all might not much matter when
competing motions are brought in Alabama and Mississippi, allowing
the losing party to seek annulment in its own home court would be
extremely disruptive for international arbitration. If a Massachusetts
seller and a German buyer agree to arbitrate in London, they expect
proceedings in England subject to judicial review by English courts.
Had they wanted arbitration and court proceedings in Berlin or
Boston they could have bargained for just that. 206 Such cross-border
meddling will inevitably invite reactions that jeopardize the stability
of cross-border arbitration, one of the great achievements of
international business law during the nearly half century since
adoption of the New York Convention.
4. Modification of Court Scrutiny
The absence of appeal on the merits of an award can be both an
advantage (no judicial second-guessing the parties’ chosen decisionmaker) and a drawback (frustrating litigants when the arbitrator
gets things wrong, thus reducing arbitration’s attractiveness in the
eyes of some business managers). In the United States, a patchwork
of uncertain case law governs the parties’ ability to engage in any
custom tailoring of their own judicial review standards. Courts have
generally interpreted the FAA to deny parties an opportunity to
reduce by contract the level of court scrutiny, 207 and attempts to
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9 U.S.C. § 10 (2003). The New York Convention also emphasizes the
primacy of the place of arbitration by providing in Article V(1)(e) that Convention
states need not recognize an award “set aside or suspended by a competent authority of
the country in which . . . that award was made.”
205.
Citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2), the Court found venue “clearly proper” in
Mississippi under the statute providing “among other things, for venue in a diversity
action in ‘a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of
the action is situated.’” Cortez, 529 U.S. at 198.
206.
Vacatur of foreign awards would also be contrary to sound prior case law.
See Int’l Standard Electric Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Industrial y
Commercial, 745 F. Supp. 172, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the FAA did not allow
vacatur of a Mexican award notwithstanding that the merits of the dispute were to be
decided under New York law). See also Four Searsons Hotels and Resorts B.V. v.
Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Industral Risk Insurers v.
MAN Guttenhoffnungschutta, 141 F.3d 1434 (11th Cir. 1998).
207.
See, e.g., Hoeft v. MVL Group Inc., 343 F.3d 57 (2003); M & C Corp. v.
Erwin Behr GmbH, 87 F.3d 844, 847 (6th Cir. 1996); supra note 143 and accompanying
text.

enlarge the scope of review for error of law and fact have been met
with mixed reception. 208
As to expansion of judicial review, the better approach might be
to provide by statute that courts shall respect the litigants’ clear
agreement for judicial review on legal and factual merits. Otherwise,
some parties might shy away from arbitration out of fear that
potential arbitrator error presents too great a risk. 209 The default
regime would remain one that provides only for review related to
procedural fairness. 210
Concerning the parties’ right to lower the standards by excluding
all judicial review at the situs, the right rule is less certain. At least
when no party to the arbitration is from the United States (thus
reducing the chances that U.S. interests will be affected by the
dispute), one can see the merit in allowing the parties complete
freedom to eliminate court intervention at the arbitral seat. On
reflection, however, the wiser path might be to permit courts to
provide minimum policing of all arbitration in the United States to
ensure basic procedural integrity and compliance with international
public policy norms.
C. Consumer and Employment Contracts Revisited
1. The Current Scope of the FAA
________________________________________________________________
208.
See, e.g., Koycera Corp. v. Prudential Bache Trade Serv., 391 F3d 987 (9th
Cir. 2003), vacating en banc Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884
(1997); Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262, 262 (4th Cir. 1997); Gateway
Techs. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1995); New England
Utils. v. Hydro-Quebec, 10 F. Supp. 2d 53, 62-64 (D. Mass. 1998); supra notes 105, 147
and accompanying text.
209.
See, e.g., William H. Knull, II & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on
International Arbitration: Is It Time to Offer an Appeal Option?, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.
531, 533 (2000) (stating that possible consumers will choose not to arbitrate because
their transactions are too large to bear the risk); Peter B. Rutledge, On the Importance
of Institutions: Review of Arbitral Awards for Legal Errors, 19 J. INT’L ARB.(2) 81
(2002); Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.
225 (1997). At least one state (New Jersey) has such a regime for its “Alternative
Procedure for Dispute Resolution Contract Actions.” See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:23A-13
(2000) (permitting vacatur because the arbitrator “committed prejudicial error by
erroneously applying the law to the issues and facts”); see also Michael Scodro,
Arbitrating Novel Legal Questions: A Recommendation for Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1927,
1946 (1996) (practitioners have recommended against bringing novel legal claims
before arbitrators).
210.
In a sense, expansion of judicial review can be seen as a restriction on
arbitral jurisdiction, with the parties giving the arbitrators power only to render only
advisory opinions. See generally Alan Scott Rau, “Arbitrability” and Judicial Review: A
Rejoinder, 1 J. AM. ARB. 159 (2002). Professor Rau uses the multipurpose term
“arbitrability” not in reference to topics that may be submitted to arbitration (in the
context of sensitive policies related to subjects such as competition and securities law),
but rather as a synonym for the contractual contours of the arbitral mission. See id.

A separate statute for international business arbitration would
be less urgent if American arbitration law contained protective
provisions for consumer and employment contracts. Recently,
however, the U.S. Supreme Court has expanded rather than reduced
the scope of the FAA with respect to such transactions. 211
Particularly instructive is the decision in Circuit City v.
Adams, 212 holding that the FAA covers all employment contracts
except those related to “transportation workers” (such as seamen and
railroad employees) engaged in interstate commerce. Hailed as a
victory for arbitration, Circuit City may end up doing more harm than
good to business arbitration. On remand the Ninth Circuit applied
the FAA, but held that the arbitration clause was unenforceable due
in part to the fact that it was linked to a limitation on damages. 213
When one legal framework covers all arbitration, such precedents
risk being trotted out in international contexts. Regardless of the
correct rule for employment contracts, the right to contract for
damage caps is clearly desirable in international commerce, where
such caps facilitate cross-border transactions by permitting
corporations to manage global risks more effectively.
2. Making Distinctions
Recognizing that values which commend arbitration in one
context make it questionable in another, Congress could enact
statutory safeguards to reduce the prospect that arbitration clauses
in standard form agreements maneuver ill-informed individuals
before biased arbitrators far from home. 214 Arbitration clauses are
different from other contracts in that they affect not only substantive
rights but also the procedure by which the rights are vindicated.
Agreements to waive access to otherwise competent courts are
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Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 116-21 (2001) (permitting
arbitration of an employment discrimination claim against an electronics retailer that
had been originally filed in California state court); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph,
531 U.S. 79, 82-83, 92 (2000) (allowing arbitration of a claim under the Truth in
Lending Act related to sale of a mobile home in Alabama). Although the arbitration
clause will bind the employee, it will not normally prevent action by government
agencies that are non-parties to the clause. See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S.
279, 296-98 (2002) (holding that E.E.O.C. may obtain victim-specific remedies in court
in an enforcement action against a former employer who had agreed to arbitrate
discrimination claims).
212.
Circuit City, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
213.
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 891-92 (9th Cir. 2002). In
addition, the Court found unconscionable the unilateral nature of the clause, which
bound only the employee. Id. at 892. For another recent case finding an arbitration
clause unconscionable, see Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 927-36 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
214.
For articles exploring the role of consent in securities arbitration, see
generally Richard Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration, Wither
Consent?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1329 (1996), Bruce Selya, Arbitration Unbound?: The
Legacy of McMahon, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 433 (1996), and Jeffrey Stempel, Bootstrapping
and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 1381 (1996).

qualitatively different from contract terms such as price or interest
rate. 215 Therefore, criteria for enforcing agreements to arbitrate
might reasonably require evidence of actual informed consent,
perhaps in the form of an agreement made after the dispute arises. 216
While no reliable studies exist of arbitration’s fairness and
efficiency, a growing body of anecdotal evidence suggests that certain
industry-specific arbitral institutions operate as assembly lines to
turn claims into awards, with inadequate notice and little due
process. Without endorsing some of the more inflammatory rhetoric of
consumer advocates and plaintiffs’ lawyers, 217 one can still appreciate
how arbitration can become an instrument of injustice when an
arbitral institution dominated by a single industry nominates
arbitrators whose reappointment (thus compensation) indirectly
depends on the satisfaction given to the industry. 218
Many scholars justify these clauses as ways to promote efficiency
and lower the price of goods and services. 219 In some cases this may
be correct, as when excessive liability inhibits productive activity. 220
________________________________________________________________
215.
See Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996
SUP. CT. REV. 331, 335 (1996) (stating that adhesion contracts lack the characteristics
traditionally providing the moral justification for enforcing the promises they contain).
216.
Other alternatives to promote informed consent (such as a separate
document) would likely be less effective, since the dominant party could in effect
require signature of the arbitration clause as a pre-condition to the main contract.
Some commentators might go even further and argue that as a matter of public policy
the right of consumers to seek redress of grievances in court should not be subject to
waiver at all. The emotional force of this argument varies according to the arbitration
paradigm one has in mind, whether “efficient dispute resolution” or “something
companies do to deny customers their day in court.”
217.
One commentator reportedly went so far as to suggest that “arbitrators are
not required to follow the law.” See interview with Cliff Palefsky, reported in Analysis
& Perspective, 70 U.S.L.W. 2755, 2756 (2002). The assertion that arbitrators are
allowed to be lawless is at odds with the existence of “manifest disregard of the law” as
a standard for judicial review, and inconsistent with the provisions of many arbitration
rules. For example, Article 17(3) of the ICC Arbitration rules requires application of
law unless the parties have expressly authorized arbitrators to act as amiables
compositeurs, a shorthand term for decisions based on the arbitrator’s sense of fairness,
free of legal constraints.
218.
If the loser in such a system is a large corporation with access to counsel,
an award based on an unjust process would normally result in a motion for vacatur, as
well as damage to the reputation of the arbitrator and the supervisory institution. The
prospect of such checks and balances seems less likely if the loser is a low-paid
employee who finds it difficult to muster resources for a challenge or a publicity
campaign.
219.
See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal
Claims: A Legal Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 223-24 (2000) (explaining that
the alternate savings enhances wealth if litigation costs exceed the increased the
increased deterrence benefits).
220.
The effect of jury verdicts on medical practice constitutes one example of
the potentially pernicious effect of undue liability. See, e.g., Nevada May Limit Jury
Awards to Stem Exodus of Doctors, BOSTON GLOBE, July 29, 2002, A-2, cols. 4-5,
reporting on orthopedists who shut down practices because of high insurance
premiums, causing closure of the trauma unit at the Nevada University Medical

It is uncertain whether merchants who escape liability in connection
with their services and merchandise will pass the savings on to the
consumer, rather than put them into management bonuses and
shareholder dividends. Other responses to the problem of too much
liability might include systematic law reform or judicial acceptance of
limitations of liability clauses, 221 rather than schemes to escape the
legal system altogether. 222
The point here is not to argue that pre-dispute arbitration
clauses are always unsuited to consumer and employment disputes.
This debate is best left to those with greater understanding of
economics and or social justice. Rather, my goal is simply to
emphasize that without limits on spillover from domestic to
international arbitration, the latter may not reach its full potential
due to uncertainty about the level of freedom from judicial
intervention. A separate statute would help to insulate arbitration
from the undue judicial intervention that is inevitable in consumer
and employment cases.
3. Importing the European Experience
Europeans take for granted that consumer transactions should
be subject to a separate legal framework. 223 The European Union has
adopted forceful limitations on the validity of consumer arbitration
clauses 224 and other “unfair” contract terms. 225

Center. Initiatives to cap malpractice awards were spurred by the discontinuance of
coverage by a group that had insured most of the state’s physicians. Id.
221.
On the “economic loss rule” in limitation of liability, see Eastern River
Steamship v. Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 868-71 (1986), expressing a need to keep products
liability and contract law in separate spheres and to maintain a realistic limitation on
damages.
222.
Admittedly there is no need for legal decisions to be the preferred form of
dispute resolution. Family, school and church controversies, for example, would seem
better resolved outside the courts. However, once the controversy implicates either
public concerns or property within the jurisdiction of some government, recourse to
state courts and legal principles becomes hard to avoid. A telling illustration can be
found in the complex criteria for judicial intervention in intra-church property disputes
in the United States, which almost from its beginnings as a federal system has aimed
to avoid the entanglement of church and state. See, e.g., Serbian Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976) (First Amendment prohibits inquiry into church
procedures); Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 488, 520 (1820) (declining to allow church
practices to be set as law).
223.
See generally Jean Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the
U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest
of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831 (2002). For a thoughtful paper on alternative
forms of consumer protection in arbitration, see David Butler, Consumer Arbitrations:
A South African and International Perspective (presented to the Southern African
Association of Arbitrators in Sandton, South Africa, Sept. 15, 2000) (copy on file with
author).
224.
Council Directive 93/13/EEC (Apr. 5, 1993), 1993 (L 95) 29; see also Council
Directive 98/27/EC, 1998 (L 166) 51 (relative to injunctions for the protection of
consumers’ interests). Consumer contracts include agreements related to property,
services or credit with any natural person acting for purposes outside his trade,

European member states have implemented this Directive in
various ways. For example, in England general consumer protection
regulations have been expressly made applicable to arbitration
agreements. 226 The 1996 Arbitration Act extends the consumer
protection scheme to arbitration agreements regardless of whether
they cover present or future disputes and regardless of what law is
applicable to the arbitration agreement. 227 Moreover, arbitration
agreements will be considered unfair (thus presumptively invalid) if
they relate to claims below an administratively fixed amount. 228
Independent of the European Union Directive, many European
countries have their own traditions of protecting consumers and less
sophisticated parties. France has long made a distinction between the
pre-dispute clause compromissoire and the post-dispute compromis,
the former being valid only in contracts between merchants

business or profession. Like any definition, this one may have unintended effects when
a consumer is the party with the economic power and sophistication. If an impecunious
carpenter builds a house for a prosperous captain of industry, the latter (entering into
an agreement outside the scope of his or her profession) would technically be the
protected consumer. Cf. LDIP art. 120 (1989) (Switz.) (governing choice of law)
(referring to contracts “for current personal or family consumption” which are “not
connected with the [consumer’s] professional or business activity”).
225.
Article 6 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC provides that such “unfair” terms
“shall not be binding.” 1993 (L 95) 31. Article 3(3) refers to an Annex of unfair terms,
which gives examples of unfairness, one of which (in § 1(q)) includes terms that hinder
consumers’ rights “to take legal action” or] “to take disputes exclusively to arbitration
not covered by legal provisions.” Id. The meaning of this curious phraseology is not
immediately clear, at least to the author. Most arbitration would seem to be “covered
by legal provisions” in the sense of being subject to the relevant national arbitration
statute. Several constructions of these words (none entirely satisfactory) could be
suggested: (1) arbitration agreements are per se invalid in all consumer transactions;
(2) consumer contracts may not contain “equity clauses” which permit arbitrators to
decide without reference to a fixed legal system; (3) consumers may not waive appeal
on questions of law, presuming such right exists under the relevant legislation.
226.
Arbitration Act §§ 89-91 extends application of the Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts Regulations of 1994, which implement European Council
Directive 93/13/EEC. Arbitration Act, 1996, §§ 89-91 (Eng.). These sections cover
Scotland, while the rest of the Act applies only in England and Wales. Id.
227.
These regulations invalidate “unfair” contract terms causing “significant
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations” to the consumer’s detriment. See
Consumer Contract Regulations §§ 3, 4. Consumers include individuals acting for
purposes outside their business. Id. § 2. One schedule to the accompanying Consumer
Contract Regulations contains an illustrative list of terms that may be regarded as
unfair, and therefore non-binding. These examples of unfairness include terms that
require consumers to “take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal
provisions.” Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, 1994, schedule 3, § 1(q)
(Eng.).
228.
The current floor on presumptive unfair claims is £5000, fixed for England,
Wales and Scotland by the Secretary of State, and for Northern Ireland by the
Department of Economic Development. Arbitration Act § 91 and Unfair Arbitration
Agreements (Specified Amount) Order 1999, 1999 No. 2167, brought into force on
January 1, 2000. On consumer arbitration in Britain, see M. J. CHAPMAN, COMMERCIAL
& CONSUMER ARBITRATION (1997).

(commerçants) or persons contracting with respect to a professional
activity. 229 In Germany, both parties must sign consumer arbitration
agreements, which must either be contained in a separate document
or have notarial certification. 230 Sweden prohibits enforcement of predispute arbitration clauses with respect to goods and services
supplied for private use. 231
American legislation to protect consumers and employees could
take the European model as its starting point. A suitable ceiling
should be imposed on the legislation’s scope, however, carving out
from the protective framework any compensation or transactions for
goods and services above a fixed sum. There would seem to be little
need to protect the CEO of a major corporation seeking to escape
arbitration commitments with respect to the purchase of a Rolls
Royce or enforcement of a multi-million dollar golden parachute. 232
D. A Smörgåsbord Approach
Outside the United States there has been widespread recognition
of the need for varying levels of judicial intervention in different types
of arbitration. As mentioned earlier, minimal review standards meet
the need for a more level playing field in cross-border arbitration.
Such a “less-is-more” approach has been adopted in many countries,
including Belgium, France and Switzerland, as well as places that
have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law such as Hong
________________________________________________________________
229.
See C. CIV. art. 2061 (Fr.) (recently liberalized by Law No. 2001-420 of May
15, 2001, art. 126, J.O., May 16, 2001, at 7776 (Loi sur les nouvelles relations
économiques, art. 126), to provide that “. . . a pre-dispute arbitration clause is valid in
contracts concluded with respect to professional activity . . . la clause compromissoire
est valable dans les contrats conclus à raison d’une activité professionnelle”). Predispute clauses are now allowed among members of the so-called liberal professions
(such as lawyers, doctors and architects), tradesmen (artisans) and farmers
(agriculteurs), as well as in professional partnerships agreements. See generally
Philippe Fouchard, La Laborieuse réforme de la clause compromissoire par la loi du 15
mai 2001, 2001 REV. ARB. 397 (2001); C. COM. art. 631 (Fr.) (covering merchants).
230.
See ZPO art. 1031(5) (F.R.G.). In Germany, the Notar (the notaire in
France, Switzerland, Belgium and analogous offices in other European countries) is a
legal professional, with little resemblance to the notary known in the United States.
231.
Lag om Skiljeförfarande, 1999, § 6, reprinted in 1999 STOCKHOLM
ARBITRATION REPORT 111 (vol. 1, 1999) (covering disputes between businesses and
consumers concerning goods and services “principally for private use” (huvudsakligen
enskilt bruk)).
232.
For a recent case in which a discharged company president was found to
have waived his right to challenge a AAA award, see Brook v. Peak International Ltd.
294 F. 3d 668, 674 (5th Cir. 2002). On arbitration of upper level employees, see Stuart
J. Schwab & Randall Thomas, What Do CEO’s Bargain For?: An Empirical Study of
Key Legal Components of CEO Contracts (forthcoming 2003-04), finding that a third of
CEO contracts (180 of the 548 surveyed) include arbitration clauses, and expressing
doubt that these clauses were the result of coercion by employers. See also Edward
Brunet, Seeking Optimal Dispute Resolution Classes in High Stakes Employment
Contracts, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 107, 110-19 (2002) (exploring dispute
resolution clauses with the highly skilled employee).

Kong and Scotland. 233 The aim is to reduce the barriers to crossborder economic cooperation created by fear of foreign fora, which can
inhibit productive risk-taking in overseas markets.
In many jurisdictions the type of judicial review will depend
principally on the parties’ election. England and New Zealand permit
litigants to opt into or opt out of appeal on the substantive merits of
the case. 234 Switzerland, Belgium, and at least one Canadian
province allow (under certain circumstances) exclusion of all judicial
review at the arbitral situs. 235
Two of these regimes merit special attention. French arbitration
law has long recognized the distinction between domestic and
international arbitration, 236 codified in decrees promulgated more
than twenty years ago. 237 Striking a balance between the goals of
arbitral autonomy and judicial scrutiny of an arbitration’s basic
procedural integrity, French arbitration law allows courts to set aside
international awards rendered in France only on statutorily-limited
grounds which are separate from those applicable in domestic
cases. 238
Switzerland goes further, and offers a choice among three
options for international arbitration. 239 As a default rule, the Swiss
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233.
See CODE JUDICIAIRE art. 1676-1723 (Belg.) (explaining the arbitration
review standards); Arbitration Ordinance, Ch. 341 (Hong Kong).
234.
See Arbitration Act, 1996, c.23, § 69 (Eng.) (providing for appeal on
questions of English law unless “otherwise agreed” by the parties). The 1996 New
Zealand Arbitration Act has a similar aim with a somewhat more complex structure.
Section 6 of the Act says that Schedule 2 (containing provisions not applicable to all
arbitration) applies to domestic arbitration if there has been no agreement otherwise
(i.e., opt out) and to international arbitration only if the parties so agree (i.e., opt in).
For example, Clause 5 of Schedule 2 allows appeal on point of law with leave of court.
Section 11 of the Act permits enforcement of an arbitration clause against a consumer
only if in a separate agreement the consumer certifies that he or she agrees to the
arbitration. See generally David A.R. Williams, The New Zealand Experience with the
UNCITRAL Model Law, 7 LCIA NEWS 4 (August 2002).
235.
See LDIP art. 192 (1989) (Switz.); CODE JUDICIAIRE art. 1717(4) (Belg.).
Through case law Ontario, Canada, seems to have arrived at somewhat the same
result. See generally Noble China, Inc. v. Lei, 42 O.R.3d 69 (1998).
236.
See generally MATTHIEU DE BOISSESON, DROIT FRANÇAIS DE L’ARBITRAGE
INTERNE ET INTERNATIONAL (1990); PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, EMMANUEL GAILLARD &
BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, TRAITE DE L’ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL (1996).
237.
See N.C.P.C. art. 1442-1491 (Fr.) (enacted in 1980 for domestic arbitration);
N.C.P.C. art. 1492-1507 (Fr.) (enacted in 1981 for international arbitration).
238.
Annulment criteria for international awards set forth in Article 1502
permit vacatur if (i) the arbitrator decided without an arbitration agreement, (ii) the
arbitral tribunal was irregularly composed, (iii) the arbitral tribunal violated its
mission, (iv) due process (literally “the principle of adversarial process”) was not
respected or (v) award recognition would be contrary to international public policy.
N.C.P.C. art. 1502 (Fr.).
239.
See LDIP art. 176-195 (1989) (Switz.). See generally P. LALIVE ET AL., LE
DROIT DE L’ARBITRAGE INTERNE ET INTERNATIONAL EN SUISSE (1989). The scope of the
LDIP is defined by a residence-oriented test, which applies the statute to an arbitration
if at least one party is foreign, in the sense of being neither domiciled nor habitually

federal statute provides five bases for challenge of awards related to
procedural fairness and public policy. 240 Parties may opt for more
expansive scrutiny under cantonal standards 241 that include vacatur
for “arbitrariness” under the Intercantonal Arbitration Concordat. 242
By explicit agreement, review of awards may be excluded entirely 243
if no party is resident in Switzerland. 244
VI. FEAR OF REFORM OVERDOSE
A. A Pandora’s Box of Special Interests
Opponents of arbitration reform in the United States sometimes
express fear that Congress will not know where to stop in cleaning up
the FAA. 245 The legislative process will open a Pandora’s box of
special interest groups wishing to tinker unduly with the enforcement
of arbitration agreements. As one colleague remarked, “You don’t
want to see how laws or sausages are made.”
In particular, there is concern that an alliance of consumer
advocates and the so-called “plaintiff’s bar” (trial lawyers who bring
tort actions) will work to reduce the enforceability of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses, which have been portrayed as a way to deny
fundamental rights and promote damage awards less generous
(others would say more reasonable) than those granted by civil
juries. 246
Apprehension of reform is puzzling on several levels. Initially,
one might ask why special interests should not get involved if change
is needed. Why should the law allow a bank to force a single mother
from Boston to arbitrate her credit card debt in Alaska under rules
resident in Switzerland at the moment the arbitration clause is signed. See Kolbrunner
v. Federici, D.T.F. (October 27, 1995).
240.
Grounds for challenge include (i) irregular composition of the arbitral
tribunal; (ii) an erroneous jurisdictional decision; (iii) a decision beyond the matters
submitted to the arbitrators, or failure to decide a matter within the request for
arbitration; (iv) failure to respect the “equality of the parties” or the adversarial
process; (v) incompatibility of the award with public policy (ordre public). See generally
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Articles 190 et 191 LDIP: Les Recours Contre les Sentences
Arbitrales, 10 ASA BULL. 64 (1992).
241.
At the present, reforms are underway to “federalize” Swiss procedural law
in a way that may ultimately reorganize provisions of the Intercantonal Arbitration
Concordat to put them on a federal level.
242.
“Arbitrariness” is defined to include “evident violations of law or equity.”
CONCORDAT INTERCANTONAL SUR L’ARBITRAGE art. 36(f) (Switz.).
243.
The statute speaks of a déclaration expresse / ausdrückliche Erklärung.
244.
LDIP art. 192 (1989) (Switz.) provides, “If neither of the parties has its
domicile, its habitual residence or a business establishment in Switzerland, they may
by express declaration in the arbitration agreement or in a subsequent written
agreement waive all judicial recourse against the arbitral award. . . .”
245.
See generally Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights Under the
Federal Arbitration Act: The Case for Reform, 4 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 157 (2002).
246.
Tort claims often find their way into arbitration through broad clauses
covering “questions related to or arising in connection with” the contract.

giving her little hope of presenting her case? Moreover, during the
past three decades the United States has seen several instances of
rational arbitration reform that did not occasion catastrophe. 247 If the
past is any guide to the future, Congress should be able to replicate
the common sense shown in earlier arbitration legislation. 248
Attacks on abusive employment and consumer arbitration have
already begun, both in the form of judicial actions 249 and
legislation. 250 In light of these understandable initiatives (some of
which actually aim at the right target), the question now may not be
whether special interest groups will get involved but whether their
influence can be channeled in a way that does not interfere with
legitimate international interests.
B. Random Change or Reasoned Reform?
The inevitability of reform makes it all the more vital to consider
a separate statute for cross-border arbitration. 251 Problematic forces
for change are operating in the backlash against arbitration of
consumer, employment, and small business disputes, 252 building on
________________________________________________________________
247.
In 1970, Chapter II of the FAA adopted the New York Convention, and in
1990, Chapter III implemented the Panama (Inter-American) Arbitration Convention.
In 1988, Congress eliminated the Act of State doctrine in enforcement of arbitration
agreements and awards, clarified the effect of sovereign immunity in international
arbitration, and refined the right of interlocutory appeal from arbitration-related court
orders. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 15-16 (2002) (explaining what an appeal may be taken from).
Moreover, in May, 2002, the so-called “Comma Act” made certain technical changes to §
10 of the FAA (providing for award vacatur). See Comma Act, Pub. L. No. 107-69, 116
Stat. 1758 (indenting, changing words, and redesignating subsections).
248.
The fear that participatory democracy cannot produce a reasonable
arbitration statute notwithstanding sensible legislation on prior occasions brings to
mind the academic gibe, “You may be right in practice, but can your idea work in
theory?”
249.
See, e.g., Kloss v. Jones, 310 Mont. 123, 146-47 (2002) (refusing to compel
arbitration against a financial adviser accused of negligence and breach of fiduciary
duty, finding the arbitration clause to be an impermissible attempt to waive access to
courts and trial by jury, which were considered basic rights guaranteed by the
Montana Constitution. For a survey of critiques against employment arbitration, see
Steven Greenhouse, Case Challenges Employees’ Waiving Right to Sue, N.Y. TIMES,
May 5, 2003, at A21.
250.
The American Arbitration Association lst year compiled a list of more than
fifty federal legislative proposals that either limit or expand ADR. See Report from
Washington—ADR Legislation of the 107th Congress, DISPUTE RESOLUTION TIMES 4
(Oct.-Dec. 2002).
251.
The inexorable nature of reform brings to mind the words carved over the
door to the house of the eminent Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung, “Vocatus atque non
vocatus Deus aderit” (Whether summoned or not, God will be present). The words were
also carved on Jung’s tombstone in the Protestant cemetery in Kusnacht, outside of
Zürich.
252.
In addition to initiatives for consumer and employment contracts, changes
related to shipping arbitration are also under consideration. The Committee on
Maritime Arbitration of the Maritime Law Association has drafted amendments that

legitimate concerns addressed several years ago by the American
Arbitration Association. 253
Legislative initiatives include the Predatory Lending Consumer
Protection Act, which would prohibit mandatory arbitration clauses
in certain mortgages, 254 and the Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract
Act, which makes pre-dispute arbitration clauses unenforceable in
automobile franchises. 255 Amendments to the FAA have been
proposed which make employment arbitration agreements
unenforceable unless concluded after the dispute arises. 256 At the
state level, anti-arbitration measures have been tailored to pass
muster on federalism concerns, 257 including a series of statutes
would cover only maritime arbitration. These proposals would permit consolidation of
separate proceedings, 9 U.S.C. § 4(b), appointment of a second arbitrator by the
claimant if the respondent fails to appoint its arbitrator promptly, subpoenas and court
assistance to preserve testimony, and arbitrator modification of awards for clerical
errors. 9 U.S.C. §§ 4(b)-(c), 7(b)-(c), 11(d) (West 2003).
253.
See American Arbitration Association, Consumer Due Process Protocol (May
1998) (implementing special measures related to matters such as consumer access to
information, convenient location, moderate cost and speed).
254.
S. 2438, 107th Cong. (2002) (introduced by Senator Paul Sarbanes, Chair of
the Senate Banking Committee). The bill would apply to any mortgage with an APR
that exceeds by six per cent (for first mortgages) or eight per cent (for second
mortgages) the rate for U.S. Treasury securities. Id.
255.
Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Act, § 11028, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116
Stat. 1758 (enacted as 15 U.S.C. § 1226), which became law in November 2002. The
statute is sometimes known as the Bono Bill in recognition of its original sponsor the
late Sonny Bono. The statute provides that “arbitration may be used to settle such
controversy [arising out of a motor vehicle franchise contract] only if after such
controversy arises all parties to such controversy consent in writing to use arbitration
to settle such controversy.” An earlier version of this law, introduced by Senators
Grassley and Feingold, would have added a Section 17 at the end of Chapter 1 of the
FAA. S. 1020, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999). The fact that the provision was kept out of the
FAA itself has provided some comfort to forces skeptical of reform. For a description of
the legislative process from the perspective of the National Automobile Dealers
Association, see Harry Stoffer, A Lesson in Sausage Making: Or How NADA Got
Congress to Ban Mandatory Binding Arbitration, 77 AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (No. 6022),
Jan. 27, 2003.
256.
S. 2435, 107th Cong. § 3 (2002) (introduced by Senators Kennedy and
Feingold). This would effectively overrule the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (discussed supra notes 211-13 and
accompanying text).
257.
The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA), however, seems to be
relatively free from the anti-arbitration backlash, leaving the issue of unconscionable
arbitration clauses to general state contract law. See Uniform Arbitration Act § 12
(amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 2002); Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter,
Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175,
226 (2002); Timothy J. Heinsz, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Modernizing,
Revising, and Clarifying Arbitration Law, 7 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 15 (2001) (stating that
the doctrine requires enforceability of arbitration agreements under state law
determined by the same standards applied to other contracts); Richard E. Speidel,
ICANN Domain Name Dispute Resolution, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, and
the Limitations of Modern Arbitration Law, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 167, 179
(2002); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: Future Lies Down a Number of Divergent
Paths, 6 J. DISP. RESOL. 16, 16-20 (2000); Stephen J. Ware, “Opt-In” for Judicial
Review of Errors of Law Under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 263, 263 (1999); see also ABA Section of Litigation, Arbitration—Fixing What’s

enacted in California. 258
Consumer advocacy groups have recently questioned arbitration
in a report published by Ralph Nader’s “Public Citizen,” arguing that
arbitration inhibits individuals from vindicating rights in consumer
and employment cases. 259 The study calls into question (as
unsubstantiated) the claim that arbitration is more economical than
court litigation. 260 Fees to arbitrators and supervisory organizations
add to the parties’ expenses. 261 And no evidence has been mustered
that expenses related to witnesses, attorneys, and discovery are lower
in arbitration than in litigation. 262
The American Bar Association has also expressed reservations
about arbitration. 263 Although allowing retainer agreements to
require arbitration of fee disputes and malpractice claims, the ABA
guidelines require that the client be apprised of arbitration’s
“advantages and disadvantages,” a requirement that will no doubt
add some fun to the negotiation of these agreements. 264
Broke After 70 Years under the Uniform Arbitration Act (ABA Annual Meeting,
Washington D.C., 1997).
258.
During 2002, the California legislature passed several measures that
regulated arbitration, effective the first of January 2003. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§
1281.92, 1281.96 (West 2003) (requiring disclosure of information by arbitrators and
publication of certain information by any “private arbitration company” that
administers consumer arbitration); see also id. at § 1284.3 (prohibiting in consumer
arbitration the assessment of fees and costs against the non-prevailing party). Ethics
standards, adopted in 2002 by the California Judicial Council, reportedly led the
American Arbitration Association to end its system for arbitrator membership in the
Association, from fear that AAA membership might be considered evidence of
arbitrator bias. California Assembly Bill 3029 (passed by the Assembly on August 30,
2002 and vetoed by Governor Gray Davis on September 30, 2002).
259.
See Public Citizen, Arbitration Q & A, available at http://www.citizen.org/
congress/civjus/arbitration/articles.cfm?ID:7490 (last visited Sept. 15, 2003) (explaining
why the group opposes arbitration).
260.
See PUBLIC CITIZEN CONGRESS WATCH, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION
(Jackson Williams ed., 2002). For comment on the report, see Thomas J. Stipanowich,
Publisher’s View on “The Costs of Arbitration,” 20 CPR ALTERNATIVES 103 (May 2002).
261.
On a societal level, of course, the cost of paying judges would have to be
factored into any comparison of courts and arbitration.
262.
See also Mandatory Arbitration Not For All Employers; Cost, Fairness Still
Subject of Debate, 70 U.S.L.W. (BNA) No. 46, at 2755 (2002) (June 2002) (offering
general discussion of recent criticisms of consumer arbitration.
263.
See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-425
(Feb. 20, 2002).
264.
Id. (concerning attorneys’ arbitration agreements with clients, which may
not include limitations of liability). The Opinion is based inter alia on MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT, Rules 1.4, 1.5 (2003) (duty to explain to client risks of alternative
courses of action and requirements of fee agreements); see also MODEL RULES FOR
CLIENT PROTECTION: MODEL RULES FOR FEE ARBITRATION R. 1(c) (2002), which style
their effect as “voluntary for clients and mandatory for lawyers if commenced by a
client”; California State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct,
Formal Op. No. 1989-116, 1989 WL 253264, *5-6; D.C. Options No. 211 and 218; cf.
Henry v. Gonzales, 18 S.W.3d 684, 692-94 (Ct. App. Tex. 2000) (Hardberger, J.,
dissenting) (upholding an arbitration clause in a retainer agreement). See generally

VII. INVESTOR-HOST STATE ARBITRATIONS
A. Blurred Lines: The NAFTA Experience
To safeguard assets abroad, the United States has traditionally
encouraged resolution of expropriation claims through arbitration,
which was presumed to be a fairer and more efficient mechanism to
determine compensation than either host state courts or gunboat
diplomacy. 265 Recently, however, classic preferences have been
blurred as have distinctions between host and investor nations and
between public and private dispute resolution. Many of the litigators
who focus on private-to-private disputes are now involved in both
“mixed” arbitration (governments and private investors) and public
disputes entirely between governments. 266 In large measure, the
transformation results from NAFTA’s investment protection scheme
which has made the United States and Canada respondents in
actions brought by investors from other NAFTA countries. 267
Consequently, North American perceptions of international
arbitration have changed vividly with the press now carrying
accusations that arbitration involves “secret tribunals” that ignore
public interest and constitute an “attack on American values.” 268

Steven Quiring, Attorney-Client Arbitration: A Search for Appropriate Guidelines for
Pre-Dispute Agreements, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1213 (2002); Alan Scott Rau, Resolving
Disputes Over Attorneys’ Fees: The Role of ADR, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 2005 (1993).
265.
See generally Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face
of NAFTA Arbitration, 28 YALE INT’L L.J. 365 (2003). See also William W. Park,
Arbitration and the FISC: NAFTA’s “Tax Veto”, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 231, 236 (2001).
Arbitration might be conducted pursuant to a private concession, perhaps using
institutional rules such as those of the ICC, or a non-supervised procedure under the
UNCITRAL Rules. In the alternative, treaty-based arbitration might go forward under
the auspices of the World Bank’s ICSID regime or one of the many bilateral investment
treaties.
266.
For example, in a recent boundary dispute before the ICJ, a British
commercial firm (Freshfields) represented claimant, a Canadian commercial arbitrator
(Yves Fortier) served as ad hoc judge and the co-author of a commercial arbitration
treatise (Michael Reisman) acted as expert. See ICJ: Case Concering Maritime
Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain, 40 I.L.M. 847,
847-52, 859, 896-97 (March 16, 2001) (giving Bahrain sovereignty over certain islands
in the “Trucial States” placed under British protection in the early 19th century to
safeguard trading routes with India from plunder by local tribes). See generally
Malcolm Evans, Decisions of International Tribunals: The International Court of
Justice, 51 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 709, 709-18 (2002).
267.
See Chapter 11, North American Free Trade Agreement, December 17,
1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289, 642-46 [hereinafter NAFTA]. Lines have also been
blurred between public and private arbitration, once considered distinct subjects. At a
recent symposium of the London Court of International Arbitration, the Deputy
Secretary General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration emphasized that institution’s
willingness to administer arbitration between private parties as well as between
sovereign states. Bette Shifman, Remarks at London Court of International Arbitration
Symposium, Tylney Hall, Rotherwick, England (May 11, 2002).
268.
An advertisement in the Washington Post attacked investment arbitration
as a “‘Fast Track’ Attack on America’s Values” with “Secret Courts for Corporations.”
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 5, 2001, at A-5 (advertisement placed by the Global Trade

Claims filed against the United States made arbitration look less
appealing. 269 Perceived threats to legislative prerogatives led to
suggested deviations from traditional arbitration practices such as
confidentiality.
The flap over NAFTA adds new dimensions to the cost-benefit
analysis of how much discretion should be given to arbitrators
conducting proceedings and judges reviewing awards. More than
most commercial arbitration, NAFTA disputes have considerable
third party effects. Intense review of NAFTA awards violates the
member countries’ commitment to leave resolution of investment
disputes to arbitrators. 270 The risk of political interference in the
NAFTA arbitral process is one more reason that international
arbitration should be subject to a more laissez-faire arbitration
scheme, which would limit the opportunity for judicial interference.
At the same time, adoption of specific procedural protocols to be
applied by arbitrators would likely encourage public respect for the
arbitral process and thereby reduce the prospect of a backlash that
would curtail the fair resolution of investment disputes. 271

Watch division of Ralph Nader’s Public Citizen advocacy group). A New York Times
article accused investment arbitration of leading to “national laws being revoked,
justice systems questioned and environmental regulations challenged.” Anthony De
Palma, NAFTA’s Powerful Little Secret, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 2001, Section 3, at 1.
Bill Moyers hosted a television special in which NAFTA was called a “sophisticated
extortion racket” in which “secret NAFTA tribunals can force taxpayers to pay billions
of dollars in lawsuits.” Now With Bill Moyers: Trading Democracy (PBS television
broadcast, Feb. 1, 2002), available at http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript_tdfull.html.
For a different approach to the interaction of international trade and governmental
regulatory structures, see Ronald A. Cass & John Haring, Domestic Regulation and
International Trade: Where’s the Race? Lessons from Telecommunications and Export
Controls, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 111, 111-54 (Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick
eds., 2002), also published in 11 JOURNAL DES ÉCONOMISTES ET DES ÉTUDES HUMAINES
531, 531-74 (2001).
269.
To some observers the U.S. attitude toward investment arbitration
suggests a double standard (arbitration for U.S. citizens abroad but not when
foreigners invest here), reminiscent of a character in a Jules Romains novel who liked
honesty “only in others.” A foreign emissary who helped himself to a share of the bribes
his government paid French newspapers was shocked that intermediaries had
skimmed from these payments. See JULES ROMAINS, 2 LES HOMMES DE BONNE
VOLONTE, Pt. 9 (Montée des Périls), Sec. XXX (Réponse de Marc Strigelius), 335 (Robert
Laffont ed., 1988) (“M. Coubersky, lequel se charge de prélever sur ces millions une
gorgée abondante, semble trouver mauvais que les intermédiaires aient une soif parente
de la sienne. C’est un homme qui aime l’honnêteté d’autrui.”).
270.
For recent reiterations of this theme, see Charles H. Brower, Beware of the
Jabberwock: A Reply to Mr. Thomas, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 465, 479 (2002);
Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge?: Developing the
International Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 193, 196-202
(2001).
271.
In addition to classic investment arbitration, the emerging arbitral
resolution of international transfer pricing disputes raises similar sovereignty-related
questions. Although framed as arbitration between two countries, the taxpayer will

Essentially, NAFTA Chapter 11 gives business managers from a
member country the right to arbitrate investment grievances
regardless of whether an agreement to arbitrate actually exists in a
negotiated investment concession, thus eliminating foreign investor
recourse to home country intervention against the host state. The
initial part of Chapter 11 imposes substantive norms for cross-border
investment (forbidding discrimination and requiring “fair and
equitable” treatment as well as compensation for nationalized
property,) 272 while the second portion provides arbitration as a
remedy for a host state’s breach of its duties. 273
B. Judicial Review and Investment Arbitration
An aggrieved investor may choose either arbitration supervised
by the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) or a proceeding conducted under the
UNCITRAL arbitration rules. 274 Should the investor want ICSID
arbitration, however, there is a slight limitation. Neither Mexico nor
Canada is yet a party to the Washington Convention establishing
ICSID, 275 and thus arbitration must proceed under the so-called
“Additional Facility” designed to give World Bank supervision outside
the Convention framework. 276
Consequently, in any available arbitration forum, NAFTA
Chapter 11 awards will be subject to judicial review at the place
where rendered. 277 Unlike “pure” ICSID arbitration (where the
Washington Convention forecloses vacatur motions in national courts

usually be the real party in interest. The evolution of fiscal arbitration will require
collaboration between tax and arbitration to create new frameworks for both the
conduct of the arbitration and judicial review of awards. See generally Brower &
Steven, supra note 270, at 195-97.
272.
NAFTA Chapter 11 echoes the compensation criteria traditionally
advocated by the United States. While the terms “prompt, adequate and effective”
compensation (which originated in a 1938 communication to Mexico from US Secretary
of State Cordell Hull) do not appear in the text of Chapter 11, the combination of
compensation factors listed in NAFTA Article 1110 (“paid without delay,” “fair market
value” and “fully realizable”) amount to the same result. See Restatement (Third)
Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. § 712, cmts. c, d, and Reporter’s n.2 (1987). NAFTA
Article 1110(1) adopts a four-part structure, requiring that the expropriation (1) have a
public purpose, (2) be applied on a non-discriminatory basis, (3) “in accordance with
due process of law and Article 1105(1)” [“fair and equitable treatment”] and (4) result
in “payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6 [of Article
1110],” which adopt the fair market value standard.
273.
See NAFTA, supra note 267, at 639-42.
274.
Id. at 643.
275.
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966), in ICSID
BASIC DOCUMENTS 25 (1985).
276.
ICSID ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES 5 (2003).
277.
NAFTA, supra note 267, at 643.

in favor of a special system of internal quality control,) 278 both
UNCITRAL and Additional Facility awards may be challenged in
national courts. 279
The significance of judicial review of NAFTA awards was
illustrated in Metalclad, 280 in which the Supreme Court of British
Columbia was required to decide whether a NAFTA award fell under
its International Commercial Arbitration Act which provides a
narrower scope of review than the otherwise applicable Provincial
statute. 281 An arbitral tribunal had ordered Mexico to pay
compensation for acts of the municipality of Guadalcazar that
prevented operation of a hazardous waste facility owned by U.S.
citizens. Although hearings were held in Washington D.C. for the
sake of convenience, the arbitration’s official situs was Vancouver.
Mexico then petitioned to have a NAFTA award set aside by the
British Columbia Supreme Court. 282
Surprisingly, the choice of applicable statute turned on the
meaning of “commercial” rather than “international.” Mexico argued
against application of the International Act (which requires that
arbitration be commercial as well as international) on the ground
that the proceedings related to a regulatory rather than a commercial
relationship. 283 The court disagreed, finding that the case was
commercial in the sense that it “arose out of a relationship of
investing.” 284 Characterizing the arbitration by reference to the
underlying transaction (a cross-border investment) placed the dispute
within the terms of the International Act. Thus court scrutiny focused
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278.
See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States, in ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES art. 52
(2003).
279.
Park, supra note 265, at 234-35.
280.
See Metalclad v. United Mexican States (Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1), 5 ICSID
209, 210-12 (ICSID Aug. 2000) (finding expropriation without adequate compensation
where a U.S.-owned company was prevented by Mexican municipality from operating a
hazardous waste facility in Mexico). For the British Columbia Supreme Court decision
vacating and remanding the award in part, see United Mexican States v. Metalclad, 5
ICSID 236, 236-38 (Judicial Review, Supreme Ct. of British Columbia (May, 2001),
deleting certain paragraphs of the prior decision and adjourning the proceedings to
give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitration for purposes of
determining certain issues related to a Mexican ecology decree. NAFTA Chapter 11
proceedings are not the ony investment arbitrations subject to judicial review. See,
e.g., Czech Republic v. CME Czech Republic B.V. (Svea Court of Appeals, Sweden, May
15, 2003), with introductory note by Thomas Wälde, 42 I.L.M. 915 (2003).
281.
The British Columbia Commercial Arbitration Act catches arbitration
excluded from the International Act (which was based on the UNCITRAL Model Law).
The domestic statute allows a more generous role for court intervention, including
appeal on points of law. Metalclad, 5 ICSID 236, 246-48 (2001).
282.
Id. at 239.
283.
Id. at 247.
284.
Id.

on whether the award exceeded the arbitrators’ powers, rather than
on whether the arbitrators made a substantive mistake. 285
Should a court in the United States face a similar scenario, it
would be unfortunate if the temptation existed to examine the
substantive merits of a case under the “manifest disregard of the law”
standard. Arbitration has been selected as the optimum way to
resolve cross-border investment disputes precisely because the
parties prefer an adjudicator less political than national courts. The
FAA’s current universality presents an invitation for mischief.
C. Political Reaction and Notes of Interpretation
For the United States, NAFTA began to create problems when
Canadian investors brought claims for failure to grant “fair and
equitable treatment” and de facto expropriation without
compensation. 286 The better known cases included complaints about a
California ban on gasoline additives, 287 a Mississippi jury award
against a Manitoba funeral director, 288 and a Massachusetts court
decision upholding Boston’s refusal to execute a land sale with a
Montreal developer. 289
Political reaction to such NAFTA cases has been intense. 290 The
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285.
In the end, the court refused to set aside the award in its entirety, deciding
that not all of the arbitrators’ findings exceeded their authority. Id. at 267.
286.
See generally Methanex Corp. v. USA, Amended Claim filed Feb. 12, 2001,
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com; Loewen Group. v. United States, Final
Award, June 26, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003); Jonathon Harr, The Burial, THE NEW
YORKER, Nov. 1, 1999, at 70.
287.
Methanex, supra note 286.
288.
Loewen Group, Inc. v. U.S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3, Interim
Award on Jurisdiction, Jan. 5, 2001, Final Award, June 26, 2003 (denying liability)
(Anthony Mason, Abner J. Mikva & Michael Mustill arbs.), 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003), at
www.naftaclaims.com. The $500 million verdict included $400 million in punitive
damages. Appeal required a bond of 125% ($625 million) as security. The rich tapestry
of this dispute is set forth in Harr, supra note 286, at 70.
289.
Mondev International Ltd. v. USA, 42 I.L.M. 85, 86, Award, Oct. 2002
(denying liability) (Ninjan Stephens, James Crawford & Stephen Schwebel arbs.). See
generally Jack Coe, Denial of Justice and NAFTA Chapter 11—The Mondev Award,
3(1) INT’L ARB. NEWS 2 (Winter 2002/2003). See also Rudolph Kass, How Sharp are the
Tiger’s Teeth, 47 BOSTON BAR ASS’N JOURNAL 10 (Sept/Oct. 2003). On the underlying
claim, see the opinion written by Justice Charles Fried (as he then was) in Lafayette
Place Assocs. v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 694 N.E.2d 820, 835-37 (Mass. 1998),
holding that the developer was precluded from suing Boston and the Boston
Redevelopment Authority.
290.
Current U.S. concerns echo the rhetoric of 19th-century Argentine
economist Carlos Calvo, who attempted to protect the economic sovereignty of Latin
America through the “Calvo Doctrine” (first announced in 1868 in LE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE), which required investor submission to local
courts, effectively eliminating arbitration. See generally, K. Lipstein, The Place of the
Calvo Clause in International Law, 1945 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 130, 137-45 (1945). In
1974, the Calvo doctrine was pushed further in the so-called “New International
Economic Order” adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in an attempt
(unsuccessful as history has shown) to give host state courts an exclusive right to
determine the measure of compensation for expropriated property. See Charter of

Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee endorsed establishment
of an appellate review of NAFTA awards 291 as well as government
screening of arbitration to avoid having “frivolous or inappropriate
claims” considered by arbitrators. 292 The current version of the 2002
Trade Act includes an appellate body to correct “manifestly erroneous
interpretations of law” and a mandate of “transparency” by making
arbitration proceedings public and allowing amicus curiae
submissions from both business and labor organizations. 293
Bowing to what some observers believe to be public pressure in
the United States, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission in 2001 issued
Notes of Interpretation, effectively interpreting (or restating,
depending on perspective) NAFTA requirements so as to limit the
liability of host countries in connection with several matters currently
sub judice. 294 Responding to the criticism of the confidentiality of
NAFTA arbitration (referred to by critics as “lack of transparency”),
the Notes of Interpretation provide that nothing in NAFTA imposes “a
general duty of confidentiality” on the parties to a Chapter 11
arbitration. 295

Rights and Duties of States art. 2(2)(c), reprinted in CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS
DUTIES OF STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND TEXT 35, discussed in William W. Park,
Legal Issues in the Third World’s Economic Development, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1321, 1327
(1981).
291.
See Rossella Brevetti, Baucus Welcomes Options Administration Is
Considering on Investor-State Disputes, BNA INT’L TRADE, Mar. 28, 2002, at 529
(discussing Letter of Mar. 26, 2002 from Max Baucus to Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick). In reaction, on Mar. 28, 2002, the Senate Finance Committee’s ranking
Republican Charles Grassley urged Trade Representative Zoellick to reject such
screening. See Rosella Brevetti, Grassley Urges Zoellick to Reject Government Screening
for Investor Suits, REG. LAW & ECONOMICS, Apr. 1, 2002, at A-6. Industry groups,
including the National Association of Manufacturers, have also expressed concern for
the preservation of investor protections for U.S.-owned businesses abroad.
292.
A similar screening mechanism already exists with respect to expropriation
claims that implicate tax measures. See NAFTA, supra note 267, art. 2103(6).
293.
See Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210 § 2102(b)(3), 116 Stat. 994
(2002), which includes the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority At of 2001 (H.R.
3005) and the Andean Trade Preference Act (H.R. 3009), accompanying House of
Representatives Report 107-518, June 19, 2002.
294.
A breach of another NAFTA provision or a separate international
agreement will not in itself establish that “fair and equitable treatment” has been
denied under Article 1105. The meaning of international law has been limited to
“customary” minimum standards, thus preventing recourse to other sources of
international law that might either impose or relax restrictions on host State
treatment of foreign investors. See Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The
New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 39798 (2003).
295.
NAFTA, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, July 31,
2001, Part A, reprinted in 13 WORLD TRADE & ARBITRATION MATERIALS, No. 6, 139, 139
(2002). In this context, it is worth noting that for decades before NAFTA, expropriation
claims against developing countries had been arbitrated in confidential proceedings
under ICSID, UNCITRAL and ICC Rules without complaint from the industrialized
investor nations.
AND

Confidentiality is nothing special for NAFTA arbitration but
represents the long-established practice for most international
arbitration. Moreover, the jury system in the United States has given
Americans long experience with secret deliberations and an absence
of reasoned decision making.
To some observers, the Notes of Interpretation constitute de facto
modification of NAFTA that departs from the member countries’
original meaning and thus requires approval in accordance with
“applicable legal procedures of each Party.” 296 To date, no satisfactory
way has been found to resolve the potential conflict between the
requirements for amendment under NAFTA and the provisions of
Chapter 11 that permit Free Trade Commission interpretations.
For investment arbitration to fulfill its promise, some
mechanism must be found to promote greater arbitral sensitivity to
vital host state interest. 297 The ebb and flow of arbitration’s wisdom
may have to accommodate political reality. While the Notes of
Interpretation may be helpful to guide arbitrators toward sensitivity
to the public interest, the task is best accomplished without the
intervention of national courts.
Expropriation cases by their nature engender political fervor,
which is why NAFTA charges international arbitrators rather than
national judges with deciding investment disputes. Clearer FAA
provisions for international arbitration, limiting the grounds for
judicial review, would be a step in resisting the risk of political
interference. An occasional “wrong” arbitral award is a small price to
pay for the net aggregate gain to prosperity through enhanced crossborder investment.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Arbitration by its nature is polycentric: one might more
accurately speak of arbitrations in the plural. A wide variety of
disputes are included into one category, implicating differences
related to the sophistication of the parties, the character of the
disputes, and the public interests at stake. The current legal
framework for arbitration conducted in the United States attempts to
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296.
See NAFTA, supra note 267, art. 2202. One award has suggested that Notes
of Interpretation which fail to respect the text of NAFTA would not be binding on
arbitrators deciding Chapter 11 disputes. See In re Pope & Talbot, 41 I.L.M. 1347,
1362-65 (2002) (ordering Canada to pay $461,556 plus interest in damages). At footnote
37 (paragraph 47) the Award states, “[w]ere the Tribunal required to make a
determination whether the [NAFTA Free Trade] Commission’s action is an
interpretation or an amendment, it would choose the latter.”
297.
For a caution about backlash toward investor-government arbitration, see
Michael Goldhaber, Czech Mate, AMERICAN LAWYER, Mar. 2002, at 87 (describing how a
U.S. investor used arbitration to vindicate expropriation claims against the Czech
Republic), which quotes a noted international arbitration lawyer warning how a
Canadian win in a high profile NAFTA case (Loewen) could cause a hostile reaction
toward NAFTA.

squeeze all types of arbitration into the Procrustean bed of a single
set of standards for judicial review.
The United States should seriously consider eliminating judicial
discretion to review the substantive merits of awards in international
cases. The domestically nourished doctrine of “manifest disregard of
the law” risks misapplication in cross-border contests. The FAA
should be cantonized into separate regimes for domestic and
international arbitration, thus permitting the latter to evolve
independent of whatever protective legislative and judicial initiatives
might be appropriate to address concerns developed in a domestic
context.
Bifurcated statutes in France and Switzerland, along with the
type of consumer protection regimes that have been implemented
through the European Union, could serve as models for the United
States. Options for different levels of judicial scrutiny of awards
should be available.
No system is likely to find the perfect balance between flexibility
and certainty. Legislators and courts will be called to a process of
regular fine-tuning that aims at a reasonable counterpoise between
competing objectives, giving business managers the appropriate
climate in which to consummate cross-border transactions.
This paper makes no suggestion of radical reform. 298 “Go slow”
seems the best approach. However, for cross-border arbitration to
reach its full potential, distinctions should be made in judicial review
of domestic and international awards.

________________________________________________________________
298.
Some great Frenchman (both Talleyrand and Valéry have been given
credit) rightly remarked, “Tout ce qui est excessif est insignificant” (Anything excessive
becomes insignificant).

Appendix: Review of International Awards Made in the United States
1. Scope
(a) Except as provided in subsection 1(b), this chapter shall apply to
any arbitration with its seat in the United States, in which at least
one party is resident or incorporated outside of the United States at
the time the agreement to arbitrate was concluded.
(b) Unless the agreement to arbitrate was entered into after the
dispute arose, this Chapter shall not apply to (i) an employment
contract in which the yearly remuneration of the employee is less
than [$ XYZ] or (ii) an agreement concluded with respect to a
consumer transaction.
(c) A consumer transaction includes any agreement related to
property, services or credit with any individual for purposes outside
his trade, business or profession if the amount in dispute is less than
[$ ABC].
2. Award Vacatur
In any of the following cases the United States court in the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award
upon the application of any party to the arbitration:
(i) a party to the arbitration agreement was under some
incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the applicable
law; or
(ii) the party making the application was not given proper notice
of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings
or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission
to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so
submitted, only that part of the award which contains decisions
on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or the
composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was
not in accordance with the agreement of the parties; or
(iv) the award was procured by fraud, bias or corruption;

(v) the award is in conflict with international public policy or the
subject matter of the dispute is not capable of being submitted to
arbitration.
3. Time Limit for Vacatur
An application for setting aside an award covered by this Chapter
must be brought no later than three (3) months from the date on
which the party making that application has received the award.
4. Jurisdiction for Vacatur
An action to vacate an award covered by this Chapter may be brought
only in the district wherein the award was made. In no event may a
federal court vacate an award made outside the United States.
5. Exclusion of Other Grounds for Vacatur
Unless the parties have explicitly provided for judicial review under
Chapter 1 of this title, no award covered by this Chapter may be
vacated on any grounds other than as provided above.

Notes
1. Separate FAA Chapter or Tinkering with Existing Provisions?
The proposal set forth above is intended as a stand-alone set of
rules to cover vacatur of awards in international proceedings
conducted within the United States. An alternative approach would
be simply to tinker with the language of Chapters 2 and 3 that
implement the New York and Panama Convention schemes for
recognition of foreign and “non-domestic” awards.
Admittedly, such a wide net may complicate the prospects for
adoption of the statute. The more obvious the change, the more likely
that there will be opposition. From a political perspective, less is often
more.
Two concerns tip the scales in favor of separate provisions. First,
judicial interpretation of the existing FAA Chapters has often been
problematic. One may wish to reduce the prospect of ill-advised
judicial creativity by establishing a framework which, to the extent
possible, will operate independently of prior case law. Second, a fresh
start would permit an approach more user-friendly to foreigners,
particularly if the text of the legislation picks up some of the
language and format used by the Model Law.

2. Fraud, Bias and Corruption
The proposed statutory language goes beyond the text of the
Model Law by suggesting inclusion of “fraud, bias or corruption” as an
explicit ground for vacatur. Some might argue that this is
unnecessary. Admittedly, those defects are subsumed under
“violation of public policy” and “inability to present one’s case,”
defenses to award enforcement that may be pressed into service
against bias and corruption under the New York Convention 299 as
well as national arbitration statutes in countries influenced by the
UNCITRAL Model Law. 300
No good reason argues for leaving these matters to judicial
interpretation. An explicit prohibition on fraud and corruption, added
for the avoidance of doubt, is unlikely to be seen to imply that fraud
and corruption are acceptable in awards subject to the New York
Convention. Moreover, inclusion of fraud, bias and corruption as
grounds for vacatur could be expected to make the legislation more
politically palatable. Otherwise, one can easily imagine complaints
that the legislative proposal lacked the most basic protections.
Explicit statutory language seems far more likely to convince
Congress of the proposal’s fairness than reference to learned foreign
treatises that link bias and fraud to public policy violations.
3. Definition of International Arbitration
The scope of the proposed legislation is narrower than that of
both FAA Chapter 2 and the UNCITRAL Model Law. The former
includes even disputes between U.S. citizens as long as they implicate
property or contract performance abroad. The Model Law combines
multiple tests, bringing within its scope arbitrations in which (i)
parties have places of business in different countries, (ii) the place of
contract performance or the place of arbitration is outside the parties’
home country, or (iii) the parties opt to treat the proceedings as
international.
A residence-based test seems more sensible. 301 The linguistic
and procedural differences that justify a laissez-faire arbitration
regime are likely to arise when U.S. residents seek to avoid courts in
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302, 306, 331, 377-82 (1981) (addressing the scope of Articles V(1)(b) (inability to
present his case) and Article V(2)(b) (violation of public policy)).
300.
With respect to public policy under the Swiss LDIP, see generally P.
LALIVE, J.F. POUDRET, & C. REYMOND, LE DROIT DE L’ARBITRAGE INTERNE ET
INTERNATIONAL EN SUISSE 430 (1989), insisting that ordre public has a procedural (as
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301.
Corporate entities should probably be considered residents if organized
under the law of, or possessing a principal place of business in, the forum country.
Thus, for example, a U.S. branch of a foreign corporation would be considered a U.S.
resident, as would an alien individual present in the United States more than 183 days
during any calendar year.

Paris, Rio or Shanghai, rather than when one U.S. citizen sues
another in New York over goods and/or services destined for export.
4. Opt-out Provisions
Some litigants may want the greater protection afforded by
whatever paternalistic intervention might be afforded under FAA
Chapter 1. Some commentators fear that expansion of judicial review
would change the character of arbitration. However, freedom of
contract would likely have beneficial effects on balance, reducing the
apprehension of “wild card” awards in high stakes cases affecting the
proverbial family jewels of a litigant. At least as between
sophisticated parties to an international contract, the right to elect
merits review would appear to be almost a corollary of the right to
elect courts. By contrast, good arguments exist for denying the right
to exclude all court scrutiny, given that an award takes on a
presumptive validity throughout the world under the New York
Convention. In other words, the statutory framework for judicial
review of international arbitration in the United States would
constitute a floor but not a ceiling.
5. Public Policy
In the hope of reducing an overly parochial use of public policy,
the statutory proposal adopts the French distinction between public
policy applicable to domestic cases and public policy applicable to
international cases. The latter concept, referred to as ordre public
international, derives from the policy national courts consider
relevant to cross-border transactions with no direct impact on the
forum. Thus, for example, an interest rate that would violate public
policy in a purely domestic transaction might be acceptable in a crossborder context.
6. Consumers and Employees
The type of laissez-faire judicial review scheme proposed for
international contracts between sophisticated parties is not
appropriate for consumer transactions and employment contracts,
where heightened court scrutiny provides a healthy measure of
paternalistic protection for the weaker party. One might argue that
such restrictions also belong in other parts of the FAA and perhaps
also in the New York Convention itself. Indeed that would seem
eminently sensible, and might well be on the agenda of those seeking
to improve other parts of arbitration’s legal framework.
7. Jurisdiction for Award Vacatur

By limiting vacatur to the place where the award is made, the
proposed legislation makes clear that U.S. courts should not be in the
business of setting aside decisions in foreign arbitrations. Contrary to
the implication in Cortez Byrd, 302 defects in awards rendered abroad
can best be addressed if and when they are presented for recognition
and/or enforcement in the United States.

________________________________________________________________
302.
See, e.g., Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Const. Co., 529 U.S. 203,
203 (2000) (justifying adoption of expansive venue requirements as a way to permit an
“action under the FAA in courts of the United States to . . . vacate awards rendered in
foreign arbitrations not covered by either convention”).

